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I. Introduction

Damages for the loss of a companion animal or pet
as a result of negligence typically are limited to the value
of the property lost, while damages for emotional harm
are generally not recoverable. 1 Arguably, however,
companion animals are more than just property with

economic worth because they are animate and capable of
being the recipient of an emotional connection to their
owners. 2 In the United States, laws such as the Fair
Housing Act, the Air Carrier Access Act, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act permit accommodations
for emotional support animals. 3 Such legislative
mandates recognize implicitly the emotional connection
of owners to their companion animals, along with the
potential for emotional harm stemming from their loss,
in contrast to the historic common law approach that
classifies them as the equivalent of inanimate objects.
This paper first briefly discusses the traditional
property classification for companion animals and the
limited damages recoverable for their loss. The paper
provides anecdotal evidence that some pet owners
categorize their animals as something other than
tangible, personal property. It then examines U.S.
1 For an overview of the traditional treatment of damages for
loss of a companion animal, see Phil Goldberg, Courts and
Legislatures Have Kept the Proper Leash on Pet Injury
Lawsuits: Why Rejecting Emotion-Based Damages Promotes
the Rule of Law, Modern Values, and Animal Welfare, 6 STAN.
J. ANIMAL L. & POL'Y 30 (2013).
2 See infra notes 150-86 and accompanying text.

3 See infra notes 75-149 and accompanying text.
[251]
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legislation which recognizes and protects the use of
emotional support animals. The paper advances the
proposition that the recognition of the psychological
benefit in such legislation inherently suggests that
damages for emotional harm should be recoverable in pet
loss cases, whether or not the animal is a trained
emotional support dog. It argues that some animals,

because of this emotional attachment to some owners,
should fall into a property-plus category. As such, in
appropriate circumstances, damages for mental distress
resulting from either the intentional or negligent
destruction of a pet should be recoverable. Finally, it
examines how contract provisions could mitigate the
recognition of a property-plus category, along with its

commensurate expansion of compensatory relief.

II. Common Law Property Law

Traditionally, the common law views pets as
property.4 As a result, damages for the loss of a pet are
limited

to compensatory

damages

representing the

market value of the property,5 although some courts have
debated other

measurements.6

Typically,

emotional

4 "Animals are generally regarded as personal property." 4 AM.

JUR. 2D Animals § 3 (2019). Under Louisiana law, a domestic
animal is considered corporeal movable property. Holland v.
Teague, 996 So. 2d 325 (La. Ct. App. 2008).

5 More specifically, dogs also are personal property for damage
purposes, and their destruction does not give rise to any cause
of action for personal injury damages. The measure of damages
is the fair market value at the time of destruction. 4 AM. JUR.
2D Animals § 116 (2019).
6 For examples of cases considering claims for fair market
value, intrinsic value, punitive damages, mental anguish and
loss of companionship, see David Favre, Overview of Damages
for Injury to Animals - Pet Losses, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR.,
MICH. ST. UNIV. (2003), https://www.animallaw.info/article
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distress damages for the loss of the pet are not
recoverable. 7 However, if an egregious and intentional
act results in the loss, some courts are willing to allow
recovery for the independent tort of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress for the outrageous
conduct.8 An examination of four example cases
illustrates the traditional common law approach to
treating animals as tangible, personal property and the

market valuation for loss.
In Strickland v. Medlen,9 a family dog was
accidentally euthanized by animal control. The dog,
"Avery," had escaped the owner's backyard and was
picked up by Fort Worth animal control. 0 The owner and
family members attempted to retrieve Avery, but lacked
enough money to pay the required fees." Although the
shelter hung a "hold for owner" tag on Avery's cage to
alert employees that the Medlens were coming for Avery,
he was placed on the euthanasia list and put to sleep. 12
Devastated, the Medlens sued for Avery's intrinsicvalue.
The court of appeals held that a dog owner may recover
intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of
/overview-damages-injury-animals-pet-losses.
For
an
examination of nuanced approaches to that measurement in
various cases, see Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Damages for
Killing or InjuringDog, 61 A.L.R. 5th 635 (1998).
7 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for
Emotional DistressDue to Treatment of Pets and Animals, 91
A.L.R. 5th 545 (2001) (discussing cases). For a comprehensive
overview of emotional distress damages in pet death cases,
see William A. Reppy, Jr., Punitive Damages in Pet-Death
Cases: How Do the Ration Rules of State Farm v. Campbell
Apply? 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 19, 24-47 (2006),
https:/scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2

368&context=faculty-scholarship&sei-redir= 1.
8 See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
9 397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013).
1b Id. at 186.
11 Id.
12 Id.

[253]
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intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. 13 On
appeal, the Texas Supreme Court determined that "[1]oss
of companionship, the gravamen of the Medlens' claim, is
fundamentally a form of personal injury damage, not
property damage," and hence, it is not recoverable. 14
In rejecting any claim for intrinsic value or loss of
companionship, the court reiterated the "majority rule
throughout most of America" and declined to "jettisonour
122-year-old precedent classifying dogs as ordinary
property, and ...

permit noneconomic damages rooted in

relational attachment."15 It determined that in cases in
which "a dog's market value is unascertainable, the
correct damages measure is the dog's 'special or
pecuniary value' (that is, its actual value)-the economic
value derived from its 'usefulness and services,' not value
drawn from companionship or other non-commercial
nevertheless,
still
considerations." 16 The
court,
recognized that "dogs are a special form of personal
property," that "animals, though property, are unique,"

and that the simple job description of most dogs is, in fact,

to "provide devoted companionship." 17

In Barking Hound Village, LLC v. Monyak, the
owners' mixed-breed dachshund, "Lola," and mixed-breed
Labrador retriever, "Callie," boarded for ten days at a
kennel owned by Barking Hound Village, LLC. 18 Three
days after picking up their dogs, Lola was diagnosed with
acute renal failure because she was "administered toxic
doses of the medication prescribed for Callie, a much
Medlen v. Strickland, 353 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Tex. App. 2011).
14 Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 191-92.
15
Id. at 198.
16 Id. at 192 (quoting Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932
(1891)).
17 Id.
The court pointed to laws that banned animal cruelty, dog
fighting, and unlawful restraints of dogs to support a
distinction of sorts. Id.
18 787 S.E.2d 191, 193 (Ga. 2016).
13
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larger dog." 19 After extensive veterinary care over a ninemonth period, including dialysis, Lola died.2 0
The Supreme Court of Georgia observed that
"Georgia law clearly provides that a pet ... is considered

the personal property of its owner."2 1 Nevertheless, it
concluded that, for cases in which an animal is
"negligently injured and subsequently dies as a result of
those injuries, the proper measure of damages
recoverable by the animal's owner includes not only the
full market value of the animal at the time of the loss plus
interest, but also expenses incurred by the owner in an
effort to cure the animal."22 The court further noted,
however, that Georgia precedent did not allow for the
recovery of damages based on the sentimental, or
intrinsic value, of this type of personal property to its

owner. 23 The appeals court had reversed the trial court's
determination that non-economic factors could be
introduced as evidence to demonstrate the dog's intrinsic
value, 24 and the Georgia Supreme Court also rejected the
trial court's approach.25

19 Id.

20

Id.
Id. at 194.
22 Id. at 195. "[W]e conclude, pursuant to long-established
Georgia precedent, that the proper measure of damages
recoverable by the Monyaks for the negligent injury and death
of their dog includes both the dog's fair market value plus
interest and any reasonable medical costs and other expenses
they incurred in treating the animal for its injuries." Id. at 197.
The court noted that "determining the reasonableness of
medical treatment and the reasonableness of its cost is a
function for the factfinder." Id. at 199.
23 Barking Hound Vill., LLC v. Monyak, 787 S.E.2d 191, 198
(Ga. 2016)
24 Barking Hound Vill., LLC v. Monyak, 771 S.E.2d 469, 472
(Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
25 Barking Hound Vill., LLC v. Monyak, 787 S.E.2d 191, 198
(Ga. 2016).
21
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In Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., the owners' dog,
"Gabby," died of medical complications after she was
negligently subjected to extreme heat for an extended
period of time at The Barkery, a dog grooming business. 26
When the owners retrieved Gabby she could not walk and
had to be carried to the car. 27 Although she was treated
at veterinary hospital, Gabby had to be euthanized. 28
Plaintiffs sued to recover damages for emotional distress
and loss of companionship. The New Jersey Superior
Court noted that there was "no New Jersey precedent
permitting a pet owner to recover non-economic damages

when a pet is negligently injured or killed." 2 9 It reviewed
decisions in other jurisdictions, including those more
open to emotional distress damages, but concluded that
public policy concerns counseled against that result.3 0
Finally, in Hendrickson v. Tender Care Animal
Hosp. Corp., the owner brought "Bear," her golden
retriever, to Tender Care to be neutered and implanted
with a microchip. 31 "After the procedures, Kristen Cage,
the veterinarian on duty that evening, noticed that Bear's
abdomen looked swollen. She ordered that x-rays be
taken to make sure that Bear did not have gastric
dilatation volvulus (GDV), a life-threatening condition
that results from the accumulation of gas, fluid, or a
combination of the two in the stomach.". 32 The vet
concluded erroneously that Bear had significant gastric
distention but not GDV. 33 Ultimately, Bear's condition

Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 2001).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29
Id. at 1144.
30
Id. at 1146.
31 312 P.3d 52, 53 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
32 Id.
26

33Id

[256]
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worsened, and he died of cardiac arrest, with the likely
cause of death being GDV.34
The owner sued for damages for the reckless
breach of bailment and emotional distress. 35 The court
observed that Washington law uniformly recognizes the
historic treatment of animals as property, with emotional
distress damages limited to cases of malicious or
intentional infliction of injury to animals.3 6 The court
further refused to create a claim for emotional distress
damages arising out of a bailment contract action,
suggesting that the "more prudential approach would be
for the Legislature to consider the matter prior to such a
change occurring." 37

These sample cases illustrate the prevailing view
about the recovery of damages for the loss of pets in the
majority of jurisdictions. While the market value is
typically recoverable, and some jurisdictions allow for
recovery of costs associated with a death caused through
negligence,

the majority

are reluctant to recognize

damages for any proposed intrinsic or unique value, for
emotional distress resulting from a negligent act, or for
loss of companionship. However, this position is likely not
shared by the majority of pet owners. The following
section examines the various ways in which pet owners
demonstrate that, to them, their pets are more than
tangible personal property valued either by the market
or replacement value, or cost to repair.
III. The Changing Role of Animals and Pets in
Society
While some animals are owned for the specific
functions they perform, such as protecting and hunting,
34

Id. at 53-54.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 57.
37 Id. (quoting Gaglidari v. Denny's Rests., Inc., 815 P.2d 1362,
1374 (Wash. 1991)).

[257]
8

A CLARION CALL FOR EMOTIONAL DAMAGES IN LOSS OF
COMPANION PET CASES
15 TENN. J.L. & POLY 250 (2021)

the majority of pets are not owned for some useful
purpose. Consequently, significant sums of money are

spent annually on pets, without any expectation of them
doing
anything
except
offering
their
owners
companionship and adoration, as noted by the Texas
Supreme Court. 38 The total U.S. pet industry
expenditures in 2019 was $95.7 billion.3 9 Estimated
expenditures for 2020 are $99 billion, categorized as:
Food $38.4 billion; Supplies/OTC Medicine $19.8 billion;
Vet Care $30.2 billion; and Other Services $10.7 billion. 40
Niche markets have developed in the pet product
and services industry, as well. For example, Chinese
herbal treatments, as well as acupuncture, are now
available for pets. 4 1 The market for grooming, training,
boarding,

pet sitting,

and dog-walking

has

nearly

doubled over the past decade, particularly price-premium
services. 42 In-home pet-sitting and dog-walking services

can prove

quite lucrative for entrepreneurs. 43 The

38 Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 198.
39 Pet Industry Market Size and Ownership Statistics, AM. PET
PROD. ASS'N, https://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_ind

ustrytrends.asp.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Jean Hofve, A Short Guide to Chinese Herbal
Medicine for Dogs and Cats, ONLY NAT. PET (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://www. onlynaturalpet. com/blogs/holistic-healthcarelibrary/a-short-guide-to-chinese-herbal-medicine-1;
Jean
Scherwenka, Chinese herbs for your dog's arthritis, ANIMAL
WELLNESS (Apr. 29, 2014), https://animalwellnessmagazine.
com/chinese -herbs -dogs -arthritis/.
42 Pet Grooming and Boarding Industry in the U.S. - Market
Research Report, IBISWORLD (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.ibis
world.com/united-states/market-research-reports/petgrooming-boarding-industry/.

43 Brett Arends, This 50-year-old dog walker retired after
making more than $1 million working just three days a week,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 28, 2019),_ https://www.marketwatch.

[258]
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availability of natural pet food stores, pet boutiques, pet
bakeries, dog spas, doggie day-care facilities, and offleash dog parks all suggest that people love and spoil
their pets. 44 Hotels also welcome pets, sometimes with
special packages designed specifically for them. 4 5
Aside from the financial investment willingly

made by owners for a net economic return of zero, there
is strong evidence that public opinion considers animals,
including pets, to be more than a just form of tangible
property. People all over the world were enthralled with
the amazing journey of Gobi, the true story of a runner
and a stray Chinese desert dog that became his faithful
companion during a marathon, with the two forging an

unbreakable bond. 46
The flip side of such a love story is the
commensurate outrage with which the public generally
responds to animal mistreatment.4 7 Horrific conditions in
puppy mills quickly draws the public ire, 48 and concern
com/story/this-50-year-old-dogwalker-retired-after-makingover- l-million-working-just-three-days-a-week-2019-08-27.
44 Julie Chen, How Much Is that Doggy in the Window, FED.
LAW.

(June

2007),

at

8,

https://www.fedbar.org/wp-

content/uploads/2007/06/sidebar-jun2007-pdf- l.pdf.
45 See Nina Ruggiero, The Best Dog-friendly Hotels in the
U.S., TRAVEL & LEISURE (June 29, 2019),

https://www. travelandleisure. com/hotels -resorts/pet-friendlyhotels/best-dog-friendly-hotels (providing examples).
46 See DION LEONARD & CRAIG BORLASE, FINDING GOBI (2017)
(recounting their incredible journey).
47 KathleenWilde, Note, Animal Law in Nevada: All Bark and
No Bite, 11 NEv. L.J. 254, 255-56 (2010).
48 See, e.g., Michele W. Forehand, Public outrage over puppy
mill should spark animal abuse law reform, DOTHAN EAGLE
(Mar.

28,

2017),

https://www.dothaneagle.com/opinion/edit

orials/public-outrage-over-puppy-mill-should-spark-animalabuse-law/article_6ce9f45a-13f9-1 1e7-875dbbdf4a150a9a.html; Lissa Guyton, Rescue group calls for more
action in alleged puppy mill case, ABC NEWS TOLEDO, OHIO
(Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.13abc.com/content/news/Local-

[259]
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for mistreatment has made pets the subject of protective
orders, as well. 49 Moreover, Congress passed the Animal
Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, which made it a
federal crime to show animals being crushed, burned,
drowned, suffocated, impaled, or subjected to other forms
of torture.5 0 Most recently, a federal law passed in 2019,
the Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act, for the

first time, makes intentional acts of cruelty themselves a
federal crime, and provides for penalties of up to seven
years in prison. 51 Animal rights advocates and their

rescue-group -calls-for-more-action-in-alleged-puppy-mill-case-

animals in protective orders); Joan MacLeod Heminway

&

564626971.html; Paul Solotaroff, The Dog Factory: Inside the
Sickening World of Puppy Mills, ROLLING STONE MAG. (Jan. 3,
2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/
the-dog-factory-inside-the-sickening-world-of-puppy-mills112161/; see also Rebecca J. Huss, Lessons Learned: Acting as
Guardian/SpecialMaster in the Bad Newz Kennels Case, 15
ANIMAL L. 69 (2008) (discussing the author's role as
guardian/special master for the American Pit Bull Terriers in
the criminal case against Michael Vick for his unlawful dog
fighting activities).
49 See, e.g., Dianna J. Gentry, Including Companion Animals
in Protective Orders:Curtailingthe Reach of Domestic Violence,
13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97 (2001) (discussing the problem of
animal abuse in the domestic violence setting and proposing
model legislation for defining and including companion
Patricia Graves Lenaghan, Safe Haven Conundrum: The Use
of Special Bailments to Keep Pets Out of Violent Households, 12
TENN. J. L. & POL'Y 79 (2017) (proposing that safe haven

shelters use a conditional bailment for the pets of domestic
violence victims to prevent the pet's return to its owner if there
was a significant risk of harm).
5O Pub. L. No. 111-294, 124 Stat. 3177 (2010).
51 Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151 (2019). The statute makes
criminal "animal crushing" defined as "actual conduct in which
one or more living non-human mammals, birds, reptiles,

or

amphibians

is

purposely crushed,

burned,

drowned,

[260]
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efforts are also a testament to a significant societal
segment's desire to ensure that animals are protected
from abuse. 52 Of particular note, is the growing
movement to stop cosmetic testing on animals, with three
states now banning the sale of cosmetics that have used
animals in testing. 53

The grieving process for the loss of a pet also
demonstrates an emotional attachment to the animal. 54
In recognition of the pain associated with such a loss,
there are numerous organizations and resources that are
available to help pet owners deal with the loss.55 Losing

injury . .

.

suffocated, impaled, or otherwise subjected to serious bodily
52 See David S. Favre, Judicial Recognition of the Interests of
Animals-A New Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 333, 334 (2005)
(evaluating how the legal system deal with the claims of
animals for protection against harms inflicted by humans);
Stephen A. Plass, Exploring Animal Rights As an Imperative
for Human Welfare, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 403, 403 (2010)
(evaluating arguments in support of more legal protection for

animals).
53 Deb Pressey, Pritzker signs statewide ban on sale of cosmetics
tested on animals, STATE-JOURNAL REGISTER (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www. sj -r.com/news/20190814/pritzker-signs-statewideban-on-sale-of-cosmetics-tested-on-animals.
54 Wilde, supra note 47, at 256-57; see also William C. Root,
Note, "Man's Best Friend": Property or Family Member? An
Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals
and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their Wrongful
Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 439-41(2002) (discussing
grief reactions reflective of the human-animal bond).

55 See, e.g., Grief Support Center, RAINBOW BRIDGE,
https://www.rainbowsbridge.com/grief-support-center/grief_s
upport_home.htm; Pet Loss and Grief Resources, BEST
FRIENDS, https://resources.bestfriends.org/article/pet-loss-andgrief-resources; Pet Loss Support, UNIV. FLA. SMALL ANIMAL
HOSP., COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE,

https://smallanimal.vethospital.ufl. edu/resources/pet-losssupport/; Pet Loss Support Hotline, CUMMINGS SCH.
VETERINARY MEDICINE, TUFTS UNIV.,

[261]
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a pet can "impair our emotional and physical health.
Symptoms of acute grief after the loss of a pet can last
from one to two months, with symptoms of grief
persisting up to a full year."5 6 The owner may experience

physical manifestations of the distress, in addition to
psychological trauma and emotional anxiety. The New
England Journal of Medicine reported that an older
woman, who suffered the loss of her dog, experienced
acute onset of severe chest pain, diagnosed as Takotsubo
cardiomyopathy, or stress cardiomyopathy, typically
preceded by a stressful or emotional event. 57
That people are willing to remain with their pets
in the face of natural disasters is another indication that
there is a sense of emotional attachment as well as a
sense of responsibility to what many owners consider to
be a family member. 58 Of the one-third of the people who
chose to stay behind during Hurricane Katrina, "[F]orty-

https://vet.tufts.edu/petloss/pet-loss-support-hotline-supportgroup-link/. For suggested approaches to coping with the loss,
see Four Steps to Take After Experiencing Pet Loss, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Feb 3, 2017), https://www.psychology
today.com/us/blog/animal-attachment/201702/four-steps-takeafter-experiencing-pet-loss.

Guy Winch, Why We Need to Take Pet Loss Seriously,
SCIENTIFIC AM. (May 22, 2018), https://www.scientific
american.com/article/why-we-need-to-take-pet-loss-seriously/.
57 Abhishek Maiti & Abhijeet
Dhoble,
Takotsubo
56

Cardiomyopathy, 377 NEW ENGLAND J. MEDICINE e24 (Oct.

2017).
58
Marianna Parraga, Texans refuse to leave pets behind as they
flee Harvey, REUTERS (August 28, 2017), https://www.reut
ers.com/article/us-storm-harvey-animals/texans-refuse-toleave-pets-behind-as-they-flee-harvey-idUSKCN1B82A1;

see

also Megan McNabb, Pets in the Eye of the Storm: Hurricane
Katrina Floods the Courts with Pet Custody Disputes, 14
ANIMAL L. 71, 73 (2007) (discussing the existing law and ethics
relevant to animal custody cases, particularly those arising
from Hurricane Katrina).

[262]
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four percent said they did not want to leave their pets." 59
As a result, Congress passed the Pet Evacuation and
Transportation Standards Act, which requires states to
create disaster plans that include arrangements for
family pets.6 0 Moreover, that sense of responsibility
accounts for emerging estate planning devices designed
specifically to address the care of the pet in the case of its
caregiver's incapacity or death. 6 1

Divorce proceedings shed additional light on the
changing role of pets. Traditionally judges treat pets as
any

other

personal

property,

subject

to

equitable

distribution or community property laws, although some
courts appear to be more open to other arguments. 62 That

people are willing to incur substantial legal costs to
obtain custody of their pets, when they could be replaced
for much less, is a testament to the fact that pets are not
59 Kathleen Struck, Pet Owners Loath to Leave Their Pals
During Evacuations, VOANEWS
(Sept.
14,
2018),
https://www.voanews.com/usa/pet-owners-loath-leave-theirpals-during-evacuations.
60
Pub. L. No. 109-308, § 2, 120 Stat. 1725, 1725 (2006) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5196 (20**). For a discussion of the
Act, see The PETS Act: Companion Animals Affected by
Natural

Disasters,

ANIMAL

LEG.

DEFENSE

FUND,

https://aldf. org/article/the-pets-act-companion-animalsaffected-by-natural-disasters/.
See also Paige Chretien,
Discretion Bites: The Current State of Animal Emergency
Planning, 8 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 249, 250 (2017)
(discussing the statute and the state of emergency
preparedness in California).
61 See Shari L. Miller, Arizona Attorney's Guide to Pet Trusts, 1
PHOENIX L. REV. 473, 476 (2008) (providing an overview on
creating pet trusts in Arizona).
62 Kirsten M. Koepsel, A Public Policy Argument for Mediation

of Pet Custody Disputes, 2 MID-ATLANTIC J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83,
85-93 (2013); see also Ann Hartwell Britton, Bones of
Contention: Custody of Family Pets, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
L. 1, 4 (2006); T. Christopher Wharton, Note, Fighting Like
Cats andDogs: The Rising Number of Custody Battles Over the
Family Pet, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 433, 434 (2008).
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just property to their owners. 63 One two-year custody

battle racked up over $150,000 in legal fees. 64 Some
commentators suggest mediation in animal custody
matters to diffuse the emotional nature of animal-related
disputes and bring peace and resolution to both parties. 65
Some couples and roommates are proactive regarding
custody issues and execute a "Pet Custody Agreement"
that outlines a living arrangement in the event of a
separation, including visitation rights and care
responsibilities.66
In sum, although the common law principles
suggest that dogs are personal property, no different than
furniture, reality suggests that humans have a symbiotic
relationship with their pets that is very different from the
one of functionality that characterizes their relationship
to inanimate objects, such as furniture.67 Some humans
love their pets, feel a great responsibility for them, and
receive what they perceive to be reciprocity of affection
63 Stanley Coren, In a Divorce Who Gets Custody of the Dog?,
PSYCHOL.

TODAY

(Oct.

03,

2018),

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/caninecorner/201810/in-divorce-who-gets-custody-the-dog.

64 Christopher Mele, When Couples Divorce, Who Gets to Keep
the Dog? (Or Cat.), N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/03/23/us/divorce-pet-custody-dog-cat.html.
65 Michael Ploudre Kaiser, Cut the Dog in Half Resolving
Animal Law Disputes Through the Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 515, 515-529
(2014).
66 See, e.g., Free Pet Agreement, LAW DEPOT, https://www.law
depot.com/contracts/pet-agreement/?loc=US#.XeMVNV7mM8, Free Pet Custody Agreement, LEGAL TEMPLATES,

https://legaltemplates.net/form/pet-custody-agreement/.
67 See Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate
Planning Issues Relating to Companion Animals, 74 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 181, 187 (2003) (discussing the domestication of
animals and the changing perception of certain companion
animals in our society).
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and dependency from them. 68 Federal law also recognizes
the support role animals can play in their relationship
with humans on an emotional level, as well as with
specific tasks. The next section discusses how federal
policy that is embodied in statutory enactments
recognizes the significance of the relationship between
animals and disabled individuals.
IV. Statutory Recognition of Emotional Support
Role under Federal Law
Service animals have been used for animalassisted activities and animal-assisted therapy for some
time. 69 Studies have found that individuals with
psychiatric disorders, such as post-traumatic stress,
seem to benefit greatly from emotional support animals.7 0
68 See John Archer, Why Do People Love Their Pets?, 18
EVOLUTION

& HUM.

BEHAVIOR

237 (1997),

https://reader.

elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/SO162309599800014?token=9DBBE
DC4FA918340C8B 55A8FDC4FBC287A685E30A146E8125BB
DB6A870BF61770F0ED6CE8350361E28649D6CE87EE9B4
(reviewing characteristics of the relationship with pets being
both sources of security and the objects of caregiving).
69 Rebecca J. Huss, Why Context Matters: Defining Service
Animals Under Federal Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1163, 1166-69
(2010).
70 Kristin M. Bourland, Note, Advocating Change Within the
ADA: The Struggle to Recognize Emotional-SupportAnimals as
Service Animals, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 197, 205-07 (2009);
Christopher C. Ligatti, No TrainingRequired: The Availability
of Emotional Support Animals as a Component of Equal Access
for the PsychiatricallyDisabled Under the FairHousingAct, 35
T. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 141-42 (2010); Chelsea HernandezSilk, They Say Emotional Support Dog, We Say Service Dog:
Why the Americans with Disabilities Act Should Recognize
EmotionalSupport Dogs as Service Animals, 21 RICH. PUB. INT.
L. REV. 313, 318-20 (2018). But see Karin Brulliard, Therapy
animals are everywhere. Proofthat they help is not, WASH. POST
(July

2,

2017),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/

animalia/wp/2017/07/02/therapy-animals-are-everywhere-
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Companion animals integrated into the programming of
correctional facilities suggest there is a decrease in
inmate violence and a potential decline in recidivism. 71
Court facility dog programs also use comfort dogs to
assist children who are involved in judicial proceedings
and who must give potentially traumatic testimony. 72
Older adults are increasingly keeping and benefiting
from companion animals, 73 and there are programs for
allowing pets to visit nursing homes, assisted living
facilities, hospitals and people in hospice care. 74 Federal
law also recognizes the beneficial relationship that can be
forged between humans and their animal companions.
The subsequent sections discuss four federal statutes
that require accommodation for service animals, and in
some circumstances, an emotional support animal (ESA).

proof-that-they-help-is-not/ (questioning some conclusions
about therapeutic effects); Kate Thayer, Despite the popularity
of emotional support animals, experts say there's little evidence
they

work,

CHICAGO

TRIBUNE

(May

30,

2018),

https://www. chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-life-emotional(evaluating
support-animals-evidence-20180521-story.html
with skepticism claims of measurable mental health benefits).
71 Rebecca J.
Huss, Canines (and Cats!) in Correctional
Institutions: Legal and Ethical Issues Relating to Companion
Animal Programs, 14 NEV. L.J. 25, 33-34 (2013) (discussing
the benefits and challenges of their integration).
72 Casey Holder, Comment, All Dogs Go to Court: The Impact
of Court Facility Dogs as Comfort for Child Witnesses on a
Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 50 HoUS. L. REV. 1155, 1156
(2013).
73 Rebecca J. Huss, Re-Evaluating the Role of Companion
Animals in the Era of the Aging Boomer, 47 AKRON L. REV.
497, 498 (2014) (arguing in favor of more support for older
adults to obtain, foster, and care for companion animals in
housing).
74 For example, Wags for Hope is a nonprofit "that provides
volunteers with their pets to bring joy to the lives of others."
WAGS FOR HOPE, https://www.wagsforhope.org/.
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A. The Fair Housing Act
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act (FHA) in

1968 to protect individuals against discrimination in the
sale or rental of housing on the basis of race, national
origin,

religion

and

color. 75

The

Fair

Housing

Amendments Act (FHAA) of 1988 complemented the FAA
by covering "handicapped" individuals as well. 76 The
definition of an individual with a handicap under the
statutes includes persons with either a physical or
mental impairment "which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, a record of
having such an impairment, or being regarded as having
such an impairment." 77 Therefore, individuals with
mental disabilities are covered under the statute,
although they arguably still face a substantial stigma in
locating housing. 78
According to the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), tenants may keep an
assistance animal - an animal that works, provides
assistance, or performs tasks for the benefit of a person
with a disability, or that provides emotional support that
75 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1968) (codified in scattered

sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619). The FHA covers a wide
range of housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(a) (2019).
76 Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19) (Note: Use of the
term "handicapped" rather than "disabled" is outdated and use
of the term in this article merely reflects the language in the
original statute). Discrimination based upon familial status is
also prohibited. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2019). Victims of
discrimination can seek redress through private lawsuits as
well as through an administrative remedy through the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 42

U.S.C. §§ 3610-14 (2019).
77 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (2019). The term excludes individuals
with a current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled
substance.
78 Ligatti, supra note 70, at 140, 151-52 (2010).
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alleviates one or more identified effects of a person's
disability. 79 The term thus covers both service animals,
such as guide dogs for blind individuals which assist with
a specific task, as well as ESAs.80 There is little statutory
or regulatory guidance on the specifics of assistance
animals, although presumably no training is required
because the ability to comfort and provide a nexus with
the person's disability is considered sufficient.81
However, there should be a nexus between the disability
diagnosis and the use of the animal in its treatment.82
Further, the presence of the animal, even in the face of a
no-pets policy, arguably should be considered as part of a
reasonable
accommodation. 8 3 The
accommodation
process is a fact specific inquiry that balances the needs

79 The animal can be excluded if it is not properly controlled
or housebroken. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(b). For other
qualifications, see Assistance Animals, HUD.GOV, U.S. DEPT.
OF HOUSING,

https://www.hud.gov/program-offices/fairhousing-equal_opp/
assistanceanimals#_WhatIsan.
80 For a discussion of HUD's more inclusive reading of the term
assistance animal to include ESAs, see Rebecca J. Huss, A
Conundrum for Animal Activists: Can or Should the Current
Legal Classification of Certain Animals Be Used to Improve the
Lives if All Animals? The Intersection of Federal Disability
Laws and Breed-Discriminatory Legislation, 2015 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1561, 1582-87 (2015).
81 Mariko Yamamoto, Mayllynne T. Lopez & Lynette A. Hart,

Registrations of Assistance Dogs in California for
Identification Tags: 1999-2012, PLOS ONE (Aug. 19, 2015),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.po
ne.0132820.
82 See Rebecca J. Huss, No Pets Allowed: Housing Issues and
Companion Animals, 11 ANIMAL L. 69, 74-75 (2004).
8
3 Ligatti, supra note 70, at 149-63. For a discussion of case law
on the accommodation of service animals under the FHA and
the waiver of a no-pet rule, see Huss, supra note 69, at 11961202.
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of individuals with disabilities with the potential adverse
impact on others. 84
B. Air CarrierAccess Act
The Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) prohibits
discrimination by air carriers based on disabilities. 85 The
regulatory guidance clarifies that passengers with
service animals on commercial flights should be protected
in certain circumstances. 86 It is yet unsettled, however,
whether Congress created a private cause of action for
damages resulting from a denial of an emotional support
companion animal accommodation under the ACAA, 87 or
whether the Act preempts state-law negligence claims for
injuries related to a failure to provide appropriate
accommodations. 88 Airlines, however, may refuse to carry
84 Kathleen Farro Ryan, Reasonable Accommodation Review of
Service Animals Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct and
Fair Housing Act: The "Fact-Specific Inquiry", FED. LAW.
(Jan/Feb
2017),
at
8,
http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-LawyerMagazine/2017/JanuaryFebruary/Columns/Spotlight-on-Civil-

Rights. aspx?FT=.pdf.
85 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2019). For a discussion of the evolution
of the ACAA and suggested changes to facilitate travel for
people with disabilities, see Erin M. Kinahan, Despite the
ACAA, Turbulence Is Not Just in the Sky for Disabled
Travelers, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 397 (2001).
86 14 C.F.R. § 382.117(a) (2019).
87 See Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1359 (11th Cir.
2002) (concluding that Congress did not intend to create a
private right of action in a federal district court to vindicate the
ACAA's prohibition against disability-based discrimination);
see also Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Recovery for Discriminatory
Conduct Under Air CarrierAccess Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 41705,
188 A.L.R. FED. 367, §§ 3&4 (2003).
88 See, e.g., Diveroli v. American Airlines, Inc., 2019 WL

5697198, *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2019) (concluding that alleged
negligence claim for failure to accommodate is disability claim
preempted by ACAA); Adler v. WestJet Airlines, Ltd., 31 F.
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animals if they determine that: (1) certain factors, such
as the size and weight of the animal, would preclude the
animal from traveling in the cabin of the aircraft; (2) the
animal would pose a "direct threat to the health or safety
of others;" (3) the animal would cause a "significant
disruption of cabin service;" or (4) the law of the
destination country would prohibit entry of the animal. 89
Previously

the Department of Transportation

(DOT) required airlines to recognize emotional support
animals (ESA) and psychiatric service animals (PSA) as
service animals, but allowed airlines to require that ESA
and PSA users provide a letter from a licensed mental
health professional of the passenger's need for the
animal.9 0 PSAs, like other traditional service animals,
are trained to perform a specific task for a passenger with
a disability, whereas ESAs provide emotional support for

Supp. 3d 1381, 1386 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (holding that the ACAA
may be relevant to the defendant airline's duty of care);
Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding that the ACAA and its implementing
regulations preempt state standards of care on providing
assistance to passengers with disabilities in moving through
the airport but not available state remedies for violating those
standards); Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119,
133 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the ACAA mandate to
ensure nondiscriminatory treatment of disabled passengers
can coexist with the standard of care required under state law).
89 14 C.F.R. §382.117(f) (2019). U.S. Airlines are not required
to accommodate certain unusual animals such as snakes,
reptiles, ferrets, rodents and spiders.
90 14 C.F.R. § 382.117(e) (2019). DOT permits airlines to
require that passengers give an advance notice of 48 hours if
they plan to travel with an ESA or PSA so that the airlines
have sufficient time to assess the passenger's documentation.
14 C.F.R. § 382.27(c)(8) (2019).
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a passenger with a mental/emotional disability but are
not trained to perform specific tasks. 9 1

Prompted by complaints concerning animals on
aircrafts, as well as the treatment of animals
transported, DOT sought public comment on the
regulation concerning the transportation of service
animals. 92 The Department sought input on ensuring

nondiscriminatory
access
for
individuals
with
disabilities, while simultaneously preventing instances
of fraud.93 Complaints suggested that online companies
sold phony certificates for service and support animals,
and there was insufficient oversight and control. 94 DOT
issued guidance in 2019 that clarified some issues, for
example, that exotic species can be acceptable emotional
support animals, that health and safety must be
reasonably documented by the passenger, and that
containment of an animal must be reasonable. 95 Most
91 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Traveling by Air
with Service Animals, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, 4-5

-

(May 16, 2018),
https://www. transportation. gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/resourc
es/individuals/aviation-consumer-protection/310476/service
animal-anprm-final.pdf.
92 Id. at 32.
93 Id. at 1, 25.
94 Hal Herzog, Emotional Support Animals: The Therapist's
Dilemma,
PYSCHOL.
TODAY
(July
19,
2016),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/animals -and-

us/201607/emotional-support-animals-the-therapistsdilemma; Joseph Darius Jaafari, Emotional Support Animals
Are Not Service Animals. Here's Why It Matters, NATIONS
SWELL (Sept. 5, 2018), https://nationswell.com/service-animalfraud-esa/. But see Regina Schoenfeld-Tacher, et al., Public
Perceptions of Service Dogs, Emotional Support Dogs, and
Therapy Dogs, 14 INT'L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1 (2017)
(reporting that misrepresentation of assistance animals is
perceived by the general public to be lower than presumed).
95 Guidance on Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Disability in
Air Travel, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION (Aug. 8, 2019),
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recently, in January of 2020, The Department of
Transportation announced a public comment period on
proposed amendments to its Air Carrier Access Act
(ACAA) regulation on the transportation of service
animals by air. 96 The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) on Traveling by Air with Service Animals

proposed to track more closely the treatment of emotional
support animals under Titles II and III of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA), 97 and define a service animal
as a dog that is individually trained to do work or perform
tasks for the benefit of a person with a disability, as well
as to include a psychiatric service animal within the
definition of a service animal, requiring it to have

https://www. transportation. gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/resourc
es/individuals/aviation-consumer-protection/345426/finalenforcement-policy.pdf. For an overview of the changes, see
Julia Thompson, Flying with an emotional support animal?
This DOTguidancemight help you, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://www. usatoday.com/story/travel/airlinenews/2019/08/08/emotional-support-animals -flights -dotissues-clarifying-guidance/1958817001/.

96 U.S. Department of Transportation Seeks Comment on
Proposed Amendments to Regulation of Service Animals on
Flights, U.S. DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION (Jan. 22, 2020),
https ://www. transportation. gov/briefing-room/us -department-

transportation-seeks-comment-proposed-amendmentsregulation-service.

97 See infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
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training like other service animals. 98 The final rule took
effect in January of 2021.99

C. The Americans with Disabilities Act

Based upon findings that discrimination persisted
against individuals with disabilities to the detriment of
those victims, as well as to the productivity of society as
a whole,100 Congress passed the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) in July of 1990 with its declared
purpose being "to provide a clear and comprehensive
98 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Traveling by Air
with Service Animals, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION (Jan. 22,

2020),
https://cms8.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/20200 1/traveling-air-service-animals -nprm.pdf. Other proposed

regulatory controls include required attestations of good
behavior and health, as well as the ability to relieve itself in a
sanitary manner on long flights, requirements for check-in, a
limitation on the number of animals per passenger (2),
prohibition on breed discrimination and a requirement that the
animal's carrier fit under the handler's foot space. Id.
99 U.S. Department of TransportationAnnounces FinalRule on
Traveling by Air with Service Animals, , U.S. DEPT. OF
TRANSPORTATION (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.transportat
ion. gov/briefing-room/us -department-transportation-

For an
announces-final-rule-traveling-air-service-animals.
overview of the changes see Traveling by Air with Service
Animals, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, https://www.tran

sportation. gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2020-12/Service%20Animal%
20Final%20Rule.pdf.
100 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2019). Congress concluded in 1990 that
"individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority
who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected
to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals
and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative
of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and
contribute to, society." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2008).
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national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."10 1 In its separate
titles, the ADA targets, inter alia, the critical areas of
Employment (Title I), Public Entities (Title II), and
Public Accommodations (Title III).102

1. Title I
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in
employment against qualified individuals with disabilities
"in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment."10 3 The Act defines the term
"qualified individual [with a disability]" as "an individual
[with a disability] who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires"
with consideration being given to the employer's judgment
as to what job functions are essential.10 4 Congress
101 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101(b) (2019). For an overview of the statutes

and its mandate, see THE ADA MANDATE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

(Paul Wehman, ed. 1993); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 413 (1991).
102
The ADA complements the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which
protects handicapped individuals, who are otherwise qualified
workers, from employment discrimination by the federal
government and by private employers who contract with the
federal government for the provision of services or property,
along with employers who administer programs receiving

federal assistance. 29 U.S.C.

§ 701-796 (2019).

42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2019). A "covered entity" means "an
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor103

&

management committee." 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2019).
104 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2019); see also John D. Ranseen
Gregory S. Parks, Test Accommodations for Postsecondary

[274]
25

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 15 IWINTER 2021 1 ISSUE 2

amended the ADA in 2008, emphasizing that the
definition of disability should be interpreted broadly to
extend to a wider class of individuals.1 0 5
The legislation defines disability as having "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities, a record of such
impairment, or being regarded as having such an
impairment."1 0 6 Major life activities include "caring for
Students: The Quandary Resulting From the ADA's Disability
Definition, 11 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 83, 89 (2005) (observing
that a disable employee must show a substantially limiting
disability that nevertheless does not prevent essential work
requirements if accommodations are provided).
105 "The definition of disability in this Act shall be construed in
favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act." ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4 (a). The
amendments clarified 1) that persons who use adaptive
measures and mitigating medications are included in the
definition of disabled, 2) that an impairment that is episodic or
in remission is still a disability if it would substantially limit a
major life activity when active, and that the employer's
perception of the degree to which the impairment may limit a
major life activity (regarded as discrimination) is irrelevant.
The Amendments also refined the term substantially limits as
meaning significantly restricted, and expanded the definition
of major life activities by including two non-exhaustive lists.
Id. §§ 2, 4. For an overview of the changes, see Notice
Concerning The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)
Amendments Act Of 2008, EQUAL EMPLOY. OPPORTUNITY
http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/amendmentsnotice.html;
COMM'N,
Paul A. Race & Seth M. Dornier, ADA Amendments Act of 2008:
The Effect on Employers and Educators, 46 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 357 (2009).
106 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2019).
The "regarded as" prong
specifically aimed at invidious bias and erroneous stereotypical
assumptions, not only about the abilities of persons with actual
disabilities, but also relating to those persons who mistakenly
were regarded as being disabled, such a burn victims, because of
prejudicial misperceptions. Alex B. Long, Introducing the New
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oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,

communicating, and working," as well as the operation of
major bodily functions.i 7 Therefore, anxiety and
depression could be a disability, provided the condition
substantially impairs one or more major life activities,
such
as
sleeping,
concentrating,
thinking,
communicating, or working.1 08

and Improved Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Assessing the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. Colloquy 217
(2008); Dale Larson, Comment, Unconsciously Regarded as
Disabled: Implicit Bias and the Regarded-As Prong of the
Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 56 UCLA L. REV. 451(2008).
107 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012). Major bodily
functions include,
for example, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth,
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory,
circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions. Id. § 12102
(2)(B).
108 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2019). See, e.g, Jacobs v. N.C. Admin.
Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 577 (4th Cir. 2015) (reversing
summary judgment for defendants and concluding that a
reasonable jury could determine that plaintiff with social anxiety
disorder established a prima facie case of disability
discrimination); Hernandez -Echevarria v. Walgreens de Puerto

Rico, Inc. 121 F.Supp.3d 296 (D.P.R. 2015) (finding sufficient
evidence to support the conclusion that plaintiff either had a
record of depression or was regarded as having a disability);
Williams v. AT & T Mobility Servs., LLC, 186 F. Supp. 3d 816
(W.D. Tenn. 2016) (concluding as a matter of law that plaintiff
met her evidentiary burden of establishing she had an actual
mental impairment because of depression): U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Gulf Logistics Operating,

Inc., 299 F. Supp. 3d 832 (E.D. La. 2018) (concluding that
plaintiff who was diagnosed with "situational depression" and
then discharged stated a cause of action for an ADA violation).
See also Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality:Mental
Illness, Employment Discrimination, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 17 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 79 (2006)
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Employers owe an affirmative duty to make
reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities
under Title I, such as by making existing facilities
accessible, restructuring jobs, modifying work schedules,
acquiring or modifying equipment or devices, providing

accessible examinations, and training materials, as well as
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations.1 0 9

The

regulations

provide

that

to

"determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it
may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an
informal, interactive process with the individual with a
disability in need of the accommodation" to identify the
limitations
of
the
disability
and
potential
accommodations
that
could
overcome
those
limitations.1 10 This process involves: 1) analyzing the job
to determine its purpose and essential functions, 2)
consulting with the employee to ascertain the precise jobrelated limitations imposed by the individual's disability
and how those limitations could be overcome with a
reasonable accommodation, 3) identifying potential
accommodations and assesses the effectiveness of each in
consultation with the employee, and 4) selecting and
implementing the accommodation that is most
appropriate for parties, considering the preferences of the
individual."'

(discussing the challenges for plaintiffs in proving a mental
impairment disability claim).
109 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2019).
11O 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)(2019).
I1I Id. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9. For a discussion of the
interactive process after the 2008 amendments, see Sandra B.
Reiss & J. Trent Scofield, The New and Expanded Americans
with DisabilitiesAct, 70 ALA. LAW. 38, 43 (2009); Christopher
Snow & Sarah Campbell, Recent Changes to Federal
Employment Laws Will Affect Utah Companies: Examining the
ADA Amendments and New FMLA Regulations, 22 UTAH BAR
J. 18, 20 (2009); Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA
Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits
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Therefore, under Title I of the ADA a reasonable
accommodation may be required as the result of an
interactive process that identifies the limitations of the
mental
disability
and
examines
potential
accommodations that could mitigate those limitations. 112
If an ESA, because of the employee's mental disability,
would improve the employee's job performance, then its
presence in the workplace should be considered as a
reasonable
accommodation.
Commensurately,
the
absence of an ESA could result in an unfair disadvantage
and illegal discrimination. The interactive process should
consider the employee's mental or physical issue and how
the animal alleviates, at least in part, that issue. In
addition to permitting the animal in the workplace, a
reasonable accommodation might also include, for
example, providing a space for the animal or allowing
time to walk the animal or care for the animal during the
workday.11 3 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) recently settled a Title I case in

which an employer failed to accommodate a truck driver
applicant because he used a service dog to assist with his
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a recognized
disability.1 1 4
Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REv. 311, 357
(2009).
112 See Reiss & Scofield, supra note 111.
113 Peter Petesch & Mark Phills, Dear Littler: Do IReally
Have to Let an Employee Bring an "Emotional Support Pig" to
Work? LITTLER (June 16, 2017), https://www.littler.com/
files/dear_littler__do_i_reallyhave_to_let_an_employeebring
_an_emotional_supportpig_to_work.pdf.
114 Press Release, Equal Emp't. Opportunity Comm'n, CRST to
Pay $47,500 to Settle EEOC Disability Discrimination and
Retaliation Lawsuit (Mar. 6, 2019). The plaintiff alleged in his
complaint that his psychiatrist prescribed an ESA to cope with
his disabilities and social interactions. EEOC v. CRST Int'l,
Inc., No. 3:17-cv-241-J-32JBT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180761
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017). See also Clark v. Sch. Dist. Five of
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Nevertheless, the undue hardship caveat of the
ADA could affect a proposed accommodation for a comfort
animal. A requested change that would result in an undue
hardship, defined as "an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense" is not required under the statute.11 5
Factors to be considered in determining whether an
accommodation would impose an undue hardship include
1) the nature and cost of the accommodation, 2) the overall
financial resources of the facility or entity involved
including the number of persons employed, and 3) the type
of operations of the entity including the composition,
structure, and functions the workforce.11 6 Additionally,
Title I recognizes an employer defense to an allegation of
discrimination based upon a qualificationstandardwhich
is "job-related and consistent with business necessity,"11 7
for example, "a requirement that an individual ... not pose
a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals
in the workplace."1 1 8
In the case of an ESA, if the presence of the animal
would result in an undue hardship, such as if the animal
posed a threat that would be unduly burdensome to
eliminate, then the accommodation would not be
required.11 9 However, inconvenience is not synonymous
Lexington & Richland Ctys., 247 F.Supp.3d 734 (D.S.C. 2017)
(allowing a teacher to bring her emotional support dog to work
helped to minimize panic attacks could be a reasonable
accommodation).
n1 42 U.S.C § 12111(10)(A) (2012).
116 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
117
8

42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
Id.

§ 12113(b).

nI See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text. In a fact-

intensive inquiry, the employee must demonstrate that the
requested accommodation is reasonable and then the burden
shifts to the employer to provide evidence that the requested
reasonable accommodation would cause an undue hardship.
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). For an
overview of the accommodation of animals in the workplace see
SPB In-Depth: Service Animals as Reasonable Workplace
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with an undue hardship, although there could be
competing concerns from other employees. For example, if
a co-worker was allergic to pet dander, then using an air
filter, arranging different shifts, or providing a private
office could minimize the adverse impact of providing an
accommodation for the animal. Requiring a trial period for
comfort animals in the workplace is also both reasonable
and wise. 120 Requiring that the animal be trained, not
disruptive, and able to navigate the workplace safely are
also reasonable standards, as is requiring documentation
to that effect.121

However, because the ADA makes it illegal to limit
or segregate an employee in a way that adversely affects
the employee's opportunities or status constitutes illegal
discrimination, 122 it would be illegal to ostracize or
segregate an employee because of their negotiated
emotional support animal accommodation. 123 Seemingly,
Disability Accommodations (US), NAT'L L. REV. (Jan 20, 2020),

https://www.natlawreview.com/article/spb-depth-serviceanimals -reasonable -workplace-disability-accommodations -us.

120 Linda Carter Batiste, Emotional Support Animals in the
Workplace: A Practical Approach, Consultants Corner, JOB
ACCOMMODATION

NETWORK

(JAN),

https://askjan.org/pub

lications/consultants-corner/vol12iss04. cfm.
121 A certification of professional training is not required
generally under the ADA. Frequently Asked Questions about
Service Animals and the ADA, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE,

https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/serviceanimalqa.pdf.

However, some documentation that the animal is not
disruptive, or a danger would be reasonable as part of the
accommodation.
122 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(1). The regulations further provide that
it "is unlawful for a covered entity to limit, segregate, or
classify a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely
affects his or her employment opportunities or status on the
basis of disability." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 (2019).
123 Care should also be taken not to disclose any private medical
information when arranging the accommodation for the
support animal. The Health Insurance Portability and
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the interactive process, as well as the undue hardship and
direct threat provisions of the statute, would address
employer concerns about animals in the workplace. Title I
of the ADA would not differentiate between service
animals and ESAs. It does not specifically permit service
dogs, so both types of animals are subject to the interactive
process for determining a reasonable accommodation. 124
2. Titles II and III
Title II of the ADA applies to state and local
government entities. It protects qualified individuals
with disabilities from discrimination in the services,
programs, and activities provided by state and local
government entities because of their disability. 125 It also
prohibits discrimination in the provision of public
transportation services, such as city buses, as well as
intercity and commuter rail, which must be readily

Accountability Act (HIPPA) requires security safeguards be
taken to protect against the disclosure of medical information
by covered entities, such as some employers. Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996).
124 Must employers allow service animals in the workplace?,
Soc'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT (SHRM) (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www. shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools -andsamples/hr-qa/pages/disabilityaccomodationsmustemployer

sallowserviceanimalsintheworkplace. aspx.

125 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). A qualified individual with a
disability is "an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and
services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities

provided by a public entity." Id.

§ 12131(2).
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accessible to, and usable by, individuals with disabilities,
including individuals who use wheelchairs. 12 6
Similarly, Title III provides that "no individual

shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of . .. any place of public

accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 12 7
Denying persons with disabilities the opportunity to
participate in programs or services (or providing

separate, but unequal, goods or services) constitutes
illegal
discrimination.
The
phrase
"public
accommodation" lists categories of establishments, some
of which include the hospitality industry, such as places
of lodging, establishments serving food or drink, places of
exhibition or entertainment. 128
Title III also requires covered entities that provide

public accommodations and public transportation to
make "reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures" to accommodate disabled individuals. 129
12642 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12150, 12161-12165. In essence, Title II
extends the prohibition on discrimination established by
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to all activities of
state and local governments regardless of whether these
entities receive federal financial assistance. For a discussion of
the Rehabilitation Act, see infra notes 143-49 and

accompanying text.

127 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012).
128 42 U. S. C. § 12181(7).
129 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12184(b)(2)(A). The Act also
requires the removal of "architectural barriers, and
communication barriers that are structural in nature" where
such removal is "readily achievable," defined as being "easily
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much
difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(9), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv),
12184(b)(2)(C).
Title III further requires that any
determination of "readily achievable" account for the impact of
the removal of the barrier upon the overall operation of the
facility. Id. § 12181(9).
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Entities that provide public accommodations or public
transportation 1) may not impose "eligibility criteria"

that tend to screen out disabled individuals, 2) must
make "reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary" to
provide disabled individuals full and equal enjoyment, 3)
must provide auxiliary aids and services to disabled
individuals, and 4) must remove architectural and
structural barriers, or if barrier removal is not readily
achievable, must ensure equal access for disabled
individuals through alternative methods. 130
However, eligibility criteria that screen out
disabled individuals are permitted when necessary for
the provision of the services or facilities being offered. 131
Moreover, policies, practices, and procedures need not be
modified, and auxiliary aids need not be provided if doing
so would "fundamentally alter" the services or
accommodations being offered. 1 32 Furthermore, auxiliary
aids are not mandated if they would result in an "undue
burden," nor is any accommodation required if, as a
result, disabled individuals would pose "a significant risk
to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated
by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or
by the provision of auxiliary aids or services."13 3
In the context of service animals, the regulations
provide that "a public entity shall modify its policies,
practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service
animal by an individual with a disability."13 4 Both titles

42 U.S.C §§ 12182(b), 12184 (2012).
Id. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1).
132 Id. §§ 12182(b) (2) (A)(ii)-(iii).
1 33
Id. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), 12182(b)(3). For a discussion of the
"fundamentally alter" and "direct threat" in the context of
service animals, see Tamara v. El Camino Hosp., 964
F.Supp.2d 1077 (2013).
134 28 C.F.R. § 35.136 (a) (2019). For an overview of the
treatment of service animals under the ADA, see ADA
130

131
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require that covered entities permit service animals to
accompany people with disabilities in all areas where
members of the public are allowed to go. 135 A service
animal helps a person to accomplish a task related to the
person's disability,1 3 6 such as a guide dog for a blind
person. 137 A service animal is defined as "any dog that is
individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the
benefit of an individual with a disability, including a
physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other
mental disability."1 38 Thus, the ADA recognizes a mental

impairment as a disability, and the regulations permit
dogs that are trained to do work or perform tasks for
persons with psychiatric or other mental disabilities. For
example, in Etine v. Linner, the plaintiff suffered from
debilitating panic attacks. 1 39 She trained her dog to climb
Requirements:

Service

Animals,

U.S.

DEPT.

JUSTICE,

https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/serviceanimalqa.html.

28 C.F.R. § 35.136 (g) (2019).
136 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2019). Federal law does not require the
dog to be professionally trained, registered, or certified. 28
C.F.R. § 35.136 (f) (2019).
137 Even though the regulations require that an accommodation
be made, cases suggest that disabled persons may still face
discrimination when accompanied by service animals. For a
discussion of several cases, see Huss, supranote 69, at 118994.
138 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2019). Since 2011, only dogs that are
individually trained to do work or perform tasks for a person
with a disability are recognized as service animals under Titles
135

II and III of the ADA. However, the regulations require public

accommodations to make reasonable modifications to policies,
practices, or procedures to permit the use of a miniature horse
by a person with a disability if the miniature horse has been
individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit
of the individual with a disability. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(9)
(2019).
139
Entine v. Lissner, No. 2:17-cv-946 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ohsd-2_17-

cv-00946/pdf/USCOURTS-ohsd-2_17-cv-00946-

l.pdf.
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on her torso during a panic attack; the pressure of his
body weight would restore her ability to breathe and
move, while the animal's smell would lower her heart
rate. 140 Such training was viewed by the courts as likely
accomplishing a task under Title 11.141
However, neither the statute nor its regulations
as yet have embraced the notion that an ESA that
provides

generic

emotional

support

without

accomplishing a specific task is covered, even though an
ESA can aid a person with an anxiety disorder or
depression to reduce stress, and arguably should be
considered as an integral part of an accommodation. 14 2
Nevertheless, the fact that mental assistance alone is not
yet defined as a task per the regulations does not detract
from the reality that comfort animals do provide
therapeutic assistance. 143
D. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protects
individuals with disabilities from discrimination "by the
federal government and by private employers who
receive assistance from or contract with the federal
government.". 14 4 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
provides that "[N]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States .
140
141

.

. shall, solely by reason

Id. at 3-4.

As a result, the dog met the definition of a service animal
under the ADA. Id. at 13. The plaintiff sought temporary
injunctive relief to preclude her removal from university
housing. Id.
142 Hernandez-Silk, supra note 70, at 315, 317-20, 332-34. See
also Bourland, supra note 70 (arguing for the recognition of
emotional-support animals as service animals under the ADA).
143 Laurel Paluzzi, Note, Four-Legged Tenants: Encouraging
Pet-Friendly Housing While Protecting Landlords from
Liability, 2 MID-ATLANTIC J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 109-111
(2013).
144 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2015).
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of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving

federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the

United States Postal Service."14 5 For example, the Act
applies to higher education and protects the right of
access for individuals with disabilities in programs and
activities that receive federal financial assistance from
the U.S. Department of Education, including both public
and private institutions.14 6 The regulations: 1) prohibit
postsecondary education recipients of federal funding
from excluding any qualified student with a disability
from its courses or programs, 147 2) require modifications

to prevent discrimination, 14 8 and 3) prohibit discrimination
against students because of the absence of educational
auxiliary aids. 149 The statute's reach extends to secondary
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2015) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988 clarified that if a state
145

agency or entity receives federal funding for any purpose, it is

subject to liability for discriminatory practices in all its
programs.
Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). For a
discussion of the statute, see Katie R. Eyer, Rehabilitation Act
Redux, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 271, 283 (2005).
146 As defined, program or activity includes a "college,
university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public
system of higher education." 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(A). For an
overview of the law as applied to education, see Protecting
Students With Disabilities, Office of Civil Rights, U.S. DEPT.
OF EDUC.,

https://www2. ed. gov/about/offices/list/ocr/504faq.html#introdu
ction.

147 45 C.F.R. § 84.43(c) (2015).
14,9 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a) (2015).
149 "Auxiliary aids may include taped texts, interpreters or
other effective methods of making orally delivered materials
available to students with hearing impairments, readers in
libraries for students with visual impairments, classroom
equipment adapted for use by students with manual
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education as well as post-secondary education, providing
there is a verifiable disability and a need for either an
assistance animal or an ESA.150 Therefore, while Titles II
and III of the ADA may not cover ESAs that provide
generic

emotional

support without

accomplishing

a

specific task, places of public accommodation still may
have a responsibility to make an accommodation, if
covered by the Rehabilitation Act.
In
sum,
federal
anti-discrimination law
recognizes that the emotional human-animal bond can
have a positive psychological effect on individuals and
requires a reasonable accommodation to be made for an
ESA in appropriate circumstances in critical areas of life:
housing, transportation, work, and education. This
endorsement belies the concept in common law that
animals are mere personal property and instead supports

the notion that animals, as animate creatures, have the
capacity to form an important emotional bond with some
owners. The following section argues for a modification of
the current common law classification from one of mere
property to one

of property-plus,

at least in those

situations where the finding of an emotional bond can be
supported.

V. Property- Plus Argument

impairments, and other similar services and actions." 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.44(d)(2) (2015).
150 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Canines in the Classroom: Service
Animals in Primary and Secondary Educational Institutions, 4
J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS (2011); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Cujo Goes to
College: On the Use of Animals by Individuals with Disabilities
in Postsecondary Institutions, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 267 (2009);
Tara A. Waterlander, Canines in the Classroom: When Schools
Must Allow a Service Dog to Accompany a Child with Autism
into the Classroom under Federal and State Laws, 22 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 337 (2012).
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Religious and philosophical arguments support a
view of pets being more than the equivalency of
inanimate property. 15 1
Buddhism, Hinduism, and
naturalist religions acknowledge that animals should be
treated humanely, while Christianity recognizes the
stewardship role mankind has in relationship to God's
creatures. 152 Philosophers such as Pythagoras, Jeremy
Bentham, and John Stewart Mill supported animal
rights, while psychiatrists have recognized a link
between
animal
abuse
and violent
crimes.15 3
Understandably, then, commentators argue that the
law's categorization of companion animals as property is

archaic because the relationship of certain animals to
humans is more than a mere property ownership one, and
their loss should be compensated more holistically. 154 The
next sections will examine the current deficiencies in
remedies in loss of pet cases, the significance of the
difference in ownership of animate verses inanimate
objects, and avenues for holistic compensation for loss.

A.

Compensation

for

Loss:

Current

Shortcomings

"First, courts must recognize that the market
value approach does not adequately compensate many
151 For a discussion of the philosophical basis for the moral
status of animals, see Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man's and
Woman's Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of
CompanionAnimals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 52-68 (2002).
152 Wilde, supra note 47, at 257-58.
1 53
Id. at 258-60.
154 Root, supra note 54, at 446. See also Amber M. LopezHunter, Note, Fur Babies Matter: My Dog Is Not Property!, 4
SAVANNAH L. REV. 259 (2017) (arguing that the emotional
capacity of dogs distinguish them from property and that a
legal correction of this misclassification would further animal
rights).
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companion animal owners whose pets have been injured
or killed through wrongful conduct." 155 The law then

should recognize damages stemming from the intentional
or negligent infliction of emotional distress. 156 The
Restatement of Torts permits the recovery of damages for
emotional harm that results from extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly inflicted,
and for bodily harm as well, if bodily harm results from
the emotional harm. 157 Specifically, a comment to the
Restatement provides the example of "torturing or
maliciously killing another's pet" as being illustrative of
extreme and outrageous conduct. 158 Thus, some courts
have allowed the recovery of damages for the plaintiffs
emotional distress resulting from outrageous conduct
that inflicts harm on pets. 159 A few courts have allowed
155
156

Root, supra note 54, at 446-47.
See, e.g., Paige Chretien, DiscretionBites: The CurrentState
&

of Animal Emergency Planning, 8 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE

ENERGY L. 249, 265-68 (2016-17). See also Debra Squires-Lee,
In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion
Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059 (1995) (arguing that
animals are more than property and that the law must
recognize and compensate emotional loss resulting from the
tortious death of a companion animal); Larissa Parker,
Reconciling Discrepancies Between Emotional Value of
Companion Animals and the Insufficient Legal Remedies for
Their Loss, 43 W. ST. U. L. REV. 105 (2015) (proposing a state
statutory change to allow emotional distress damages for
intentional infliction cases and gross negligence, as well as
negligence).
157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS

§ 46 (AM. LAW INST.

2012).

158 Id. § 46 cmt. d.
159 Andrew K. Lizotte, "The Enormous Radio": Expanding
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Causes of Action
under the Theory of the Commodity Fetish, 59 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 501, 515-17 (2009); Huss, supra note 150, at 93-97. See
also, e.g., Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542 (Wash. App.
2006) (awarding emotional distress damages to an owner
whose pet had been intentionally set on fire); La Porte v.
Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So.2d 267 (Fla.1964)
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such damages for gross negligence. 1 60 Such situations
also may be appropriate for exemplary or punitive

damages for the defendant's egregious conduct.16 1 These
decisions are encouraging - courts should not exclude pet
owners from receiving non-economic damages when
outrageous conduct precipitates a loss simply because,

(awarding damages is appropriate for the malicious
destruction of a pet whatever the animal's value); Brown v.
Crocker, 139 So.2d 779 (La. App. 1962) (permittingrecovery of
damages for shock and mental anguish experienced for
animal's shooting); Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1985) (allowing damages for mental anguish and trauma
for pet that was negligently and recklessly shot and killed
under an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of
action); Plotnik v. Meihaus, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1590, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 585 (2012) (allowing damages economic and emotional
distress damages plaintiffs for intentional infliction but not
negligent infliction); Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2001) (allowing damages for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress for the conversion and slaughter of pet
horses).
160 Knowles Animal Hosp. Inc. v. Wills, 360 So.2d 37 (Fla. App.
1978) (allowing owner to collect emotional damages for gross
negligence in a veterinary malpractice case). See also
Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454
(Alaska 1985) (indicating a willingness to recognize a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for the
intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal in an appropriate
case).
161 Punitive damages are recoverable in cases in which the
defendant engaged in willful, wanton, and reckless behavior
resulting in the pet's injury or loss. In contrast, emotional
distress damages compensate for the effect the outrageous
conduct has on the plaintiff. Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving
Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases: Recognizing Pets'
Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification, 26
S. ILL. U. L.J. 31, 44 (2001).
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historically, animals were viewed as being no different
from furniture. 162
Nonetheless, non-economic damage awards for
egregious conduct do not provide

precedential support

for non-egregious situations in which the loss was the
result of negligence. In other words, the awarding of
damages for either the intentional or the negligent
infliction of emotional distress would not apply to a
simple negligent action, for example, if a boarding
establishment or medical facility causes the loss of the
animal in the absence of any outrageous conduct.
Without intentional or wanton conduct by the defendant,
exemplary damages would not be forthcoming either.
Even with circumstances supporting a punitive damage

award, if the pet's actual value is insubstantial, then due
process limitations could constrain an award of punitive
damages that bears no relationship to actual loss,
resulting in an award that is not the effective deterrent
generally associated with an exemplary damage
award.163
See Marcella S. Roukas, Determining the Value of
Companion Animals in Wrongful Harm or Death Claims: A
Survey of U.S. Decisions and an Argument for the
Authorization to Recover for Loss of Companionship in Such
Cases, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR., MICH. ST. UNIV. (2011)
(providing a comprehensive list of federal and state decisions
in cases dealing with the issue of damages for harm to
162

companion animals and arguing for change); see also Peter

Barton & Frances Hill, How Much Will You Receive in
Damages from the Negligent or IntentionalKilling of Your Pet
Dog or Cat?, 34 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 411 (1989) (examining
valuation methods under case law and arguing that the market
value approach should be abandoned because it treats pets as
fungible when they are not).
163

Reppy, supra note 7, at 47-52. Factors to be considered in

aligning punitive damages awards within the constraints of the
Due Process Clause include the degree of the defendant's
reprehensibility, the ratio of the punitive damage award to the
actual harm inflicted, and the severity of civil or criminal
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Although the Hawaii Supreme Court permitted
damages for negligent conduct resulting in an animal's
destruction, 164 that recovery remains an exception to the
typical gap in remedy for wrongful conduct. The
Restatement treats the negligent loss of an animal as a
loss of property with the commensurate emotional harm
"insufficiently infrequent or significant to justify a tort
remedy. While pets are often quite different from other
chattels in terms of emotional attachment, an actor who
negligently injures another's pet is not liable for
emotional harm suffered by the pet's owner." 165 Although
admitting the "real and serious" existence of actual
emotional harm, the comment to the Restatement
justifies the rule against "liability for emotional harm
secondary to [the pet's] injury" because it limits the
liability of veterinarians for malpractice in order to make
services more readily available. 166 The comment creates
an incongruity of recognizing harm yet denying relief

based upon potential costs and a perceived, yet
unsubstantiated, outcome. However, costs can be
controlled contractually by the parties in appropriate
circumstances without denying the existence of actual
emotional harm.16 7
Compensatory economic damages, on the other
hand, may be forthcoming for more than the market
value approach in some cases. Historically, animals were
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct. Id.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)
(concluding that an excessive punitive damages award in a
consumer fraud case violated the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution).
164 Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066
(Haw. 1981) (awarding damages for emotional distress brought
about by the negligence of the Animal Quarantine Station).
165 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 47 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST.
2012).
166 Id.
167

See infra notes 220-46 and accompanying text.
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of value aside from their role as a pet; for example, dogs
were used in hunting, retrieving, and herding. 168 By
analogy, for a trained service animal, or recognized ESA,
damages presumably should be greater either because of
the investment in their training or because of the loss of
their emotional service function. 169 Moreover, any costs
associated with unsuccessful medical treatment should
be awarded as economic damages, as well. 170 However,
there are situations in which neither of those economic
168

The dog groups recognized by the American Kennel Club are
organized by the original work that each breed was developed
to do. Five of the seven groups perform functions designed to
assist humans: working dogs, herding dogs, hounds, sporting
dogs and terriers. The 7AKC Dog Breed Groups Explained, AM.
KENNEL CLUB, https://www.akc.org/expert-advice/lifestyle/7akc-dog-breed-groups -explained/. See also GINO PUGNETTI,
SIMON & SCHUSTER'S GUIDE TO DOGS (Elizabeth Meriwether
Schuler, ed., 1980).
169 See McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644
N.E.2d 750 (1994). In McDonald, a German shepherd pedigree
was paralyzed as the result of malpractice by the state
veterinary hospital. The court allowed "the dog's unique
pedigree and the time invested in specialized, rigorous
training" to be considered in awarding damages, but not
sentimentality. For a comprehensive analysis of the economic
valuation of animals, including the minority view in states that
apply some sort of measure of special damages where a
companion animal has little or no market value. See Geordie
Duckler, The Animal As an Object of Value, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS

IN

ANIMAL

LAW:

LEADING

LAWYERS

ON

COMPLYING WITH EVOLVING REGULATIONS AND OVERCOMING

ANIMAL RIGHTS CHALLENGES, ASPATORE (Jan. 2015), 2015 WL

832413, at *8-*21 (asserting that a term change is ineffectual
and may produce adverse consequences in cases in which an
animal causes harm).
170 See Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Indus., 131 P.3d 1248, 125253

(Kan.

Ct.

App.

2006)

(allowing

reimbursement

for

reasonable veterinary treatment); Leith v. Frost, 899 N.E.2d
635, 641 (Ill. Ct. App. 2008) (allowing compensation for
veterinary costs, rather than only market value).

[293]
44

A CLARION CALL FOR EMOTIONAL DAMAGES IN LOSS OF
COMPANION PET CASES
15 TENN. J.L. & POLY 250 (2021)

injuries would occur. For example, in the last decade
rescue adoption has grown in popularity, as more and

more people have opened their hearts and their homes to
rescue animals. 171 With rescue animals, there is no
market value or enhanced value resulting from the
animal's contribution; out-of-pocket medical expenses
associated with the loss may be nonexistent as well,
depending on the circumstances. Further, the incident
which caused the pet's demise may not involve any kind
of outrageous conduct, either intentional or negligent, for
which emotional distress damages should be awarded.
In such situations, nominal damages are all that
may be forthcoming for their tortious loss, even if the
owner experiences real emotional loss. 172 In Jankoski v.
Preiser Animal Hospital, Ltd., an Illinois appeals court
recognized that compensatory damages should be
measured by the
animal's value to the owner as
established "by such proof as the circumstances admit"
171 Alicia Parlapiano, Why Euthanasia Rates at Animal
Shelters Have Plummeted, N.Y. TIMES (Sept 3, 2019),

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/upshot/why-euthanasiarates -at-animal-shelters -have -plummeted.html. Animals have
even been transported from places with no spay or neuter
restrictions to those who have a reduced rescue population
because of effective spay-neuter laws, but not without some
critics. Kate Murphy, Everyone Wants a Rescue Dog. Not
Everyone Can Have One., N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2019),

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/sunday-review/adoptrescue-dog-south.html.

172 For example, an Ohio appeals court reiterated that, as
personal property, damages for loss of a pet are limited to the
difference between the property's fair market value before and
immediately after the loss. The court further noted that,
because of this standard, damages are seldom awarded for the
loss of a family pet, because they have little or no market value.
Sokolovic v. Hamilton, 195 Ohio App.3d 406, 410 (Ct. App. Ohio
2011). Nominal damages are awarded if there is legal harm
but no recognized loss. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 8.
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which may include "some element of sentimental value in
order to avoid limiting the [owner] to merely nominal

damages." 173 Some courts seem willing to recognize that
the proper measure of damages should be the value of the
pet to the owner, which may include an intrinsic
valuation or loss of companionship measure. 174
Unfortunately, there is little consistency in their
evaluation. 175 Presumably, courts that allow recovery for
Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087
(1987). This reasoning is contrary to most jurisprudence. See,
173

e.g., Shera v. N.C. State Univ. Veterinary Teaching Hosp., 723

S.E.2d 352 (N.C. App. 2012) (holding that the market value
measure of damages applies in cases involving the negligent
destruction of personal property, such as pets, whether
sentient or not); Kaufman v. Langhofer, 222 P. 3d 272 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2009) (holding that emotional distress damages arising
out of tortious loss of personal property were not recoverable).
174 See, e.g., Anzalone v. Kragness, 826 N.E.2d 472 (2005)
(suggesting that damages could be based on the pet's value to
the owner rather than the pet's fair market value); Rabideau
v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001) ("Labeling
a dog 'property' fails to describe the value human beings place
upon the companionship that they enjoy with a dog."); See also

Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., 510 N.E.2d 1084
(1987) (allowing damages based on the value of the pet to the
owner, including an element of sentimental value, but not an
independent cause of action for loss of companionship). For a
discussion of the Anzalone case, see Kelly Wilson, Note,
Catching the Unique Rabbit: Why Pets Should Be Reclassified
as Inimitable Property Under the Law, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
167, 190-92 (2009).
175 Jason R. Scott, Death to Poochy: A Comparisonof Historical
and Modern FrustrationsFaced by Owners of Injured or Killed
Pet Dogs, 75 UMKC L. REV. 569, 574-82 (2006); see also
Katelyn Cook, Fighting for Fido: An Analysis of Arizona
Animal Cruelty Laws and the Legal Status of Animals, 8 ARIz.
SUMMIT L. REV. 179, 202 (2014) (advocating for a value to
owner theory). For a critique of a valuation approach that
includes an intrinsic or unique value see Goldberg, supra note
1, at 53-56.
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emotional or sentimental value do so through a legal
fiction that the value to the owner includes an element of
the owner's feelings for the pet. 176 However, while an
heirloom may have sentimental value, it is still
inanimate with no potential for any mutuality of
sentiment, so the analogy to that category of property is

somewhat flawed. "Animals are not humans and are not
inanimate objects," 177 and there are significant
consequences flowing from that characterization.
B. Property Plus: Recognition of the Animate/
Inanimate Distinction

There is a distinct difference between animate
and inanimate property. 178 Scientists determined that
animals are capable of learning, remembering, and
feeling emotion, including pain, fear, suffering, and
empathy-all of which are impossible cognition or
Anzalone v. Kragness, 826 N.E.2d 472, 477-78 (2005)
(citation omitted). For an overview of the Anzalone case, see
Jason Krause, Pet Owner Can Sue for Sentimental Value, THE
NAT'L PULSE: ABA J. E-REPORT (March 25, 2005),
http://animallawonline.blogspot.com/2005/03/pet-owner-cansue-for-sentimental.html. See also Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443
N.Y.S.2d 285, 286-87 (1980) (considering the loss of
companionship as an element of damages in the negligent
death of a pet). For a discussion of this approach, see Huss,
supra note 150, at 89-93 (2002).
177 David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50
DUKE L.J. 473, 502 (2000); see also Corso v. Crawford Dog and
Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1979)
(holding "that a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special
place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal
176

property").

178 For example, unlike inanimate objects, the actions of an
animate object may not always be predicted with certainty nor
be subject to control. State v. Williams, 449 So.2d 744, 747

(1984).
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emotional characteristics of inanimate objects. 179 It
follows then, that the owner's empathy or sympathy
associated with the animal's pain, fear, and suffering, in
addition to the emotional loss experienced by the owner,
should be compensable. Damages may not be for any
distress stemming from outrage associated with an
independent tort, but from emotional harm flowing from
the negligent act that resulted in the pet's loss. The loss
of a pet due to a negligent act is more than a property

loss, more than a loss of companionship; it is also the
emotional cost of grief, sorrow, heartache and the void
resulting from the loss. 180 It is a harm to the human

owner beyond the economic loss of property. As animate
beings, there is a depth, uniqueness, and multidimensional quality of the human-pet relationship. 18 1
Many owners consider their pets to be part of the family
and their behavior bears that premise out. 182
One commentator suggests that pets should still
be considered property, but a loss of companionship
measure should be a component that attaches to a pet
injury

compensatory

claim. 183

Other

commentators

suggest a unique classification for compensation of loss
that would differentiate the traditional property
classification and provide adequate compensatory

179

Cook, supra note 173, at 182-87 (discussing research on

animal cognition) (citations omitted).

180 Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation:
Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82 NEB. L. REV. 783, 793 (2004).
181
Id. at 811.
182 Elizabeth Paek, Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family:
Dismantling the Property Classification of Companion Animals
by Statute, 25 U. HAw. L. REV. 481, 484-90 (2003). Courts may
not agree. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So.2d 109, 110
(Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1995) ("While a dog may be considered by
many to be a member of the family, under Florida law, animals
are considered to be personal property.").
183 Epstein, supra note 159, at 46-48.
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damages. 184 Yet another commentator argues that there
is a need to assign monetary worth to animals like
companion pets and a need to refine the concept of special
value in this context. 185 Other commentators advocate for
improving the legal status of animals so that they are not
misclassified as generic property, plagued by constraints

that follow such classification. 186
In addition to the pet's economic value,
compensation for the loss of the animal's companionship,
and punitive damages when the defendant's wrongful act
was intentional or malicious, the legal system should
compensate for the intangible elements of the humananimal relationship because of the mental anguish that
an owner experiences upon the wrongful death of a pet. 187
The ultimate goal should be to compensate owners, or
"guardians,"188 for the loss of companionship as well as
184 Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room Sofa: Changing the

Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 314, 376-88 (2007); Lauren M. Sirois, Recovering for the
Loss of A Beloved Pet: Rethinking the Legal Classification of
Companion Animals and the Requirements for Loss of
Companionship Tort Damages, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 122730 (2015) (supporting the creation of a unique semi-property

classification); Wilson, supra note 172, at 183-96 (arguing for
a classification of inimitable property).

185 Geordie Duckler, The Economic Value of Companion
Animals: A Legal and Anthropological Argument for Special
Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L. 199 (2002).
186

See Cook, supra note 173, at 199-200 (favoring such a

change to expand permissible damage awards in appropriate
circumstances); Favre, supra note 175, at 502 (suggesting the

construction of "a new paradigm that gives animals the status
of juristic persons without entirely severing the concept of
property ownership").
187 Livingston, supra note 178, at 823-34.

188 Some observers suggest that the use of the term "guardian"
instead of "owner" better characterizes the relationship of
humans to animals. See, e.g., Susan J. Hankin, Making
Decisions About Our Animals' Health Care: Does It Matter
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the price of the mental anguish associated with that loss
in both egregious and negligent circumstances based
upon the innate characterization of pets as living beings,
and, depending on both the human and the animal, the
potential to form an emotional bond.
C. Objections to Reform and Responses
There are concerns about recognizing a property-

plus categorization of animals based on any
distinction, 189 such as between animate and inanimate
property. One is that damages would cascade out of
control without any means of ensuring fairness in the
financial burden placed upon a negligent defendant,19 0 or
perpetrate fraudulent claims. 19 1 It is argued that the
potential

adverse

economic

impact

on

veterinary

providers and pet-related services, including boarding,
grooming, and training, could have the unfortunate effect

&

Whether We Are Owners or Guardians?,2 STAN. J. ANIMAL L.
POL'Y 1, 5-19 (2009); Plass, supra note 52, at 416-17; Wilde,
supra note 47, at 276-77. But see Duckler, supra note 167, at

*1, *6-*8 (asserting that a term change is ineffectual and may
produce adverse consequences in cases in which an animal
causes harm).
189 For example, the court in Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc.
refused to depart from the traditional remedy for several
reasons. The court feared that it might be difficult to define
who may be entitled to recover, difficult to ensure the fairness
of the financial burden placed upon a negligent defendant, and
difficult to control the predicted onslaught of future litigation.
Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1145-46 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 2001).
190 Scott, supra note 173, at 586-87. Interestingly, in a Hawaii
case where emotional distress damages were awarded to
multiple family members for the negligent loss of a pet, the
total amount, $1000, was not astronomical. See Campbell v.
Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Haw. 1981).
191 Wilde, supra note 47, at 279-80 (refuting such contentions).
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of making affordable care less available to pet owners. 192
However, plaintiffs always bear the burden of proof and
must establish, not only the value of the pet, but also
emotional distress damages resulting from the loss. 1 9 3
Also, the remittitur is a judicial control that can be
utilized if the damages award bears no relationship to the
evidence presented. 194 Moreover, sufficient insurance
helps to mitigate any onerous financial burden on the
defendant, and can be purchased by the party in a better
position to avoid the loss. Additionally, for professional
providers of veterinary and other pet services, there are
contractual protections available to mitigate any
Draconian result in compensating an emotional injury.19 5
Conversely, even assuming that there currently is
affordable care for most owners, there is very little
incentive for quality control in the provision of services
unless the animal is an expensive pedigree. For pets with
little or no market value, providers are virtually immune

from any financial penalty for the negligent performance
of their duties. 196 Worst case scenario, it may be difficult
192 Goldberg, supra note 1, at 67-79; see also Strickland v.
Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 193-96 (Tex. 2013). But see Hankin,
supra note 182, at 393-410 (2007) (suggesting that veterinary
groups will benefit from clarifying legal parameters and any
change in the legal status of companion animals).
193 Root, supra note 54, at 446-47; see also State v. M'Duffie,

34 N.H. 523, 526 (1857) (asserting that pecuniary value need
not be established to maintain an action for the killing of an
animal because it is for the jury or judge to determine value
based on the evidence).
194 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 401 (2019).
195 See infra notes 220-46 and accompanying text.

196 "Most animals kept for companionship have no calculable
market value beyond the subjective value of the animal to its
owner, and that value arises purely as the result of their
relationship and the length and strength of the owner's
attachment to the animal." Hyland v. Borras, 316 N.J. Super.
22, 25, 719 A.2d 662, 664 (App. Div. 1998). In the absence of
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for providers to collect any amount owed for services
resulting in the pet's death, but that would be the only
financial penalty. Moreover, the financial burden
argument sets a poor precedent. If a poorly designed jet

aircraft causes millions in damages, should the legal
system ignore the harm in part because of the substantial
financial burden, perhaps even a threat of bankruptcy, to
a negligent defendant?
Another concern is that the accurate valuation of
animals in a property-plus category may be complex; 19 7

however, complexity should not dictate that a falsity
persist, i.e., that there is no harm, because compensation
for loss suffered is an underlying value in the tort
system. 198 An additional concern is a moral one
concerning the humanizing
of dogs and the
of humanity. 199
devaluation
commensurate potential
However, the recognition by the legal system that an
animal is animate, not inanimate, property, and that

there is a difference in ownership, in fact validates
human owners who have an emotional attachment and
recognizes their bond. "Companion animals, to the extent
that they have a social 'purpose' created by humans, are
most emphatically non-commercial objects valued
market value there is no claim for damages because damages
for property loss are typically limited to the "fair market value
of the property at the time of its destruction." Gill v. Brown,
107 Idaho 1137, 1138, 695 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Ct. App. 1985).
Thus, there would be no damages recoverable for causing the
negligent loss of property if the property had no market value.
197 See Duckler, supra note 167, at *8-*23 (considering animals
as objects of economic value in both the justice system and the
animal rights community).
198 Squires-Lee, supra note 154, at 1080-96.

199 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A

Legal/ContractualistCritique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27 (2009);

Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Dubious Grail: Seeking Tort Law
Expansion and Limited Personhood as Stepping Stones
Toward Abolishing Animals' Property Status, 60 SMU L. REV.
3 (2007).
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entirely for the comfort and well-being they impart to
their owners as a benefit of ownership." 20 0

In other words, damages may be greater if the
owner's emotional need was greater, but the recognition
of the psychological support function of the companion
pet can be generalized to owners without a medically
recognized need. At the same time, only a subset of
owners may be entitled to damages for emotional harm.
Not all owners have an emotional connection to their
animals. The atrocious conditions under which some
owners keep their animals illustrates this proposition. 20 1
Further, some animals are possessed only as they were
historically, to perform specific functions, such as
hunting, and not for companionship. Therefore, only
some owners would be able to state a claim for damages
for emotional harm, based upon evidence that there was
harm resulting from the loss, with indicia of how the
animal was treated during its life as supporting evidence
of the claim. 20 2

200 Duckler, supra note 183, at 221.
201 See, e.g., Emileigh Forrester, Terrell Co. Animal Control
searches for owner of dog left tied up without food, water, WALB
NEWS 10 (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.walb.com/2020/
0 1/03/terrell-co-animal-control-searches -owner-dog-left-tiedup-without-food-water/; Kathryn Varn, Owner arrested after
dog left in car for five hours dies in Clearwater, TAMPA BAY
TIMES

(Dec.

31,

2019),

https://www.tampabay.com/news/

crime/2019/12/31/owner-arrested-after-dog-left-in-car-for-fivehours-dies-in-clearwater/; Sarah Martinez, San Antonio
Woman Charged with Animal Cruelty After Leaving Dogs in
Cages Without Enough Food or Water, SAN ANTONIO CURRENT

(Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives
/2020/01/03/san-antonio-woman-charged-with-animal-crueltyafter-leaving-dogs-in-cages-without-enough-food-or-water.
202 Examples could include testimony as to the care the animal
received, the attention typically given to the pet by the owner,
and time spent in activities together.
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D. Effecting Change
Either state legislatures or judges are capable of
effecting reform in the availability of damages for the loss
of a pet.20 3 Some legislatures have tackled the
compensation issue, at least in part. 20 4 For example, a
provision of the Illinois Humane Care for Animals Act,
which became effective in 2008, provides a civil cause of
action for damages sustained by owners whose animals
have been the victim of aggravated cruelty or torture. 20 5
The statute provides that such damages "may include,
but are not limited to, the monetary value of the animal,
veterinary expenses incurred on behalf of the animal, any
other expenses incurred by the owner in rectifying the
effects of the cruelty, pain, and suffering of the animal,
and emotional distress suffered by the owner."20 6 The
legislation also permits "punitive or exemplary damages

of not less than $500 but not more than $25,000 for each
act of abuse or neglect to which the animal was
subjected," in addition to "reasonable attorney's fees and
costs actually incurred by the owner" in pursuing the
claim. 20 7 Therefore, the statute recognizes an owner's

entitlement to emotional distress, within the limited
circumstances presumably aligned with the tort of
outrageous conduct. 208
203 See Root, supra note 54, at 446-49 (discussing legislative
and judicial approaches); see also Vasiliki Agorianitis,
Comment, Being Daphne's Mom: An Argument for Valuing
Companion Animals as Companions, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
1453, 1469-72 (2006) (suggesting that judicial and legislative
involvement is required).
204 Scott, supranote 173, at 588-90 (discussing Tennessee and
Illinois initiatives).
205 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2019).
206 Id. (emphasis added).
207

Id.

208 See supranotes 155-59 and accompanying text.
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The Tennessee statute is more expansive. That

law allows an owner up to $5,000 in the recovery of
noneconomic damages if "a person's pet is killed or
sustains injuries that result in death caused by the
unlawful and intentional, or negligent, act of another or
the animal of another," providing that the death or fatal
injury occurs "on the property of the deceased pet's owner
or caretaker, or while under the control and supervision
of the deceased pet's owner or caretaker."20 9 Such
noneconomic damages are recognized as "compensation

for the loss of the reasonably expected society,
companionship, love and affection of the pet."210 The
definition of pet is limited to domesticated dogs and
cats. 211 Further, the limitation of noneconomic damages
does not apply to causes of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 2 12 The provision exempts an action
for professional
negligence
against a licensed
veterinarian for noneconomic damages, as well as
nonprofit and governmental agencies which act on the
behalf of public health or animal welfare. 2 13
Some supporters of change advocate a legislative
solution, 214 but legislative action has some drawbacks.
First, statutes may be too specific to address every
situation that could arise, and courts could be reluctant
TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(1) (2019) (emphasis
added).
2 10
Id. § 44-17-403(d).
2 11
Id. § 44-17-403(b).
2 12
Id. § 44-17-403(c).
2 13
Id. § 44-17-403(e).
214 Hankin, supra note 182, at 388-90; Logan Martin,
Comment, Dog Damages: The Case for Expanding the
Available Remedies for the Owners of Wrongfully Killed Pets in
Colorado, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 921 (2011); Sirois, supra note
209

182, at 1226; Wilde,

supra note 47, at 276-79; see also

Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 196-98 (Tex. 2013)
(suggesting that the legislature is the best avenue for reform
efforts, if reform is needed).

[304]
55

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 15 IWINTER 2021 1 ISSUE 2

to employ an expansive contextual interpretation.215

Second, definitions may be appropriate in one context,
but less suited in other contexts. For example, the Illinois
statute defines an animal as "every living creature, other
than man, which may be affected by rabies," 2 16 which
could be appropriate under some provisions but
problematic others. 2 17 Third, advocates in legislative
bodies may be sparse, and lawmakers' attitudes
generally indifferent. The Tennessee statute, the "T-Bo
Act" was passed after the legislator who introduced it lost
his Shih Tzu to a large, aggressive dog not properly
contained. 218 Not every state has a legislator with a
personal story who is sympathetic to the plight of pet
owners who lose their companions to negligence or
outrageous circumstances. On the other hand, legislation
could expressly provide for attorneys' fees, like the
Illinois statute, 219 which would allow litigation to be
maintained even in the absence of large damage awards.
Of course, it is the common law that classified pets
simply as property, and common law judges uniquely can

respond to the need to clarify and qualify common law
classifications and doctrines as situations emerge. 220 The
organic evolution of the common law is well-suited to
incremental distinctions as various fact driven cases
present themselves for resolution, and litigants can drive
that change. Unfortunately, common law judges often
215 See, e.g., 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2.02 (2019) (employing an
expansive definition of "animal").
216 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2019).
217 For example, the criminalization of the intentional
destruction of all animals under that definition would prohibit
killing animals for food. Duckler, supranote 167, at *61.
218 Wilde, supra note 47, at 272.

219 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2019).
220 "Because the doctrine was judicially created, it is not
exclusively a legislative issue and it may be judicially
qualified." Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (1989)
(discussing partial abrogation of the parental immunity
common law doctrine).
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punt and point to the legislature to effectuate change so
that they are not seen as legislating from the bench. 22 1
Nevertheless, the precedent is judicially created and can
be qualified judicially and morphed in reaction to
changing social circumstances. To date, more inroads
into the antiquated property classification have been
made by courts, than by legislatures. 222
VI. Agreements to Limit Liability

One concern that is voiced for legally recognizing
the emotional harm caused by the negligent or
intentional loss of a pet is that the potential liability that
would result for professional pet caretakers and medical
personnel. 223 However, in the majority of cases in which
the loss is caused by simple professional negligence,
appropriately drafted contract classes can limit risk
exposure,

leaving only

the most egregious

acts

of

negligence and intentional conduct subject to damages.
A. Exculpatory Clause
An exculpatory clause in a contract immunizes
parties from their negligence and denies an injured party
the right to recover damages from the tortfeasor. 224
Although such clauses are included in contracts, they
may not always be enforced. 225 Under contract law, an

Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 195-97; Hendrickson, 312 P.3d at

221

57.

222 See supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.

223 See supranotes 188-190 and accompanying text.
224 57A AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 47 (2019).

225 Three states refuse to enforce them: Louisiana, Montana,

and Virginia. Other states have varying standards or rigor or
leniency. Exculpatory Agreements and Liability Waivers in All
50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, https://www.mwl-

law.com/wp -content/uploads/2018/05/EXCULPATORY-
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exculpatory clause may be subject to a claim of
unconscionability
and
rendered
unenforceable.226
Moreover, exculpatory clauses do not insulate acts of
gross negligence or willful conduct, with clauses
purporting to exclude liability for such conduct being
unenforceable.227 Typically, courts evaluate exculpatory
clauses to determine if the clause was the result of free
choice or instead part of an adhesion contract for which
there was little or no free bargaining. 228 An exculpatory
clause is more likely to be considered valid if there was a
degree of freedom of choice in the person, facility or
service seeking exculpation. 229 Further, if a facility or
service seeking exculpation is one of convenience rather
than necessity, then it is less likely unequal bargaining
power will be of importance and the clause is more likely
to be enforced.230
The court in Tunkle v. Regents of University of
California enumerated the criteria generally cited in

AGREEMENTS-AND-LIABILITY-WAIVERS-CHART00214377x9EBBF.pdf.
226 For an overview of the doctrine of unconscionability and
exculpatory clauses generally, see James F. Hogg, Consumer
Beware: The Varied Application of UnconscionabilityDoctrine
to Exculpation and Indemnification Clauses in Michigan,
Minnesota, and Washington, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1011,
1012-1020 (2006)
227 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

195 (1) (1979). See

also Barnes v. Birmingham Int'l Raceway, Inc., 551 So. 2d 929,
933 (Ala. 1989) (concluding that pre-race releases are valid and
consistent with public policy as to negligent conduct but are
invalid and contrary to public policy as to wanton or willful
conduct).
228 57A AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 62 (2019). A critical evaluation
is justified in this context to discourage negligence and to
protect parties who need goods or services from being exploited
by persons with greater bargaining power. Id.

229 57A AM. JUR. 2d Negligence
230

§ 64 (2019).

Id
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evaluating the legitimacy of an exculpatory clause. 2 31 In
evaluating an exculpatory clause, courts will determine
whether or not the agreement:
1) affects a public
interest, 2) concerns a business of a type generally
suitable for public regulation, 3) touches a service of great
importance to the public, 4) involves a service offered to
any qualified member of the public who seeks it, 5)
confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract without any provision for paying additional
reasonable fees to obtain protection, and 6) requires the
person or property to be placed under the control of the
party seeking exculpation, subject to a risk of
carelessness. 2 32

So, for example, applying the Tunkle criteria, an
exculpatory clause would be more likely to be enforced in
contracts involving leisure activities, such as scuba
diving or horseback riding, or as opposed to crucial
services, such as childcare or medical procedures. 233 In
essence, the Tunkle criteria examine the validity of the
function of an exculpatory clause and its effectiveness as
an enforceable assumption of risk agreement. 234 To be an
enforceable exculpatory agreement, risks should be
clearly and unambiguously disclosed with language that
is reasonably understandable to the ordinary person. 235
383 P.2d 441 (1963).
Id. at 444-46.
233 57A AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 61 (2019).
234 See Russ VerSteeg, Negligence in the Air: Safety, Legal
Liability, and the Pole Vault, 4 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 109,
156-58 (2003) (discussing express assumption of risk).
235 Patricia C. Kussmann, Validity, Construction, and Effect of
Agreement Exempting Operator of Fitness or Health Club or
Gym from Liability for PersonalInjury or Death of Patron, 61
A.L.R.6th § 12 (Originally published in 2011). See also Jordan
v. Diamond Equip. & Supply Co., 207 S.W.3d 525, 530 (2005)
(requiring that the contract "clearly set out what negligent
liability is to be avoided."); Monitronics Int'l, Inc. v. Veasely,
323 Ga. App. 126, 135 (2013) (reasoning that because these
231

232
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In sum, it is less likely to be against public policy
to exculpate from simple negligence than gross
negligence or willful malfeasance, from recreational or
optional activities than necessary services, and from
property loss than human loss or personal injury.2 36 For
these

reasons,

recognizing

a property-plus category

would be important to pet owners seeking to invalidate a
clause. Arguably, it might be harder for providers of pet
services to limit liability contractually for service animals
or ESAs because of their functionality in rendering an
important service to the owner, as recognized under
federal antidiscrimination law, as well.
Applying the Tunkle criteria to providers of pet

services, such as groomers, boarding kennels and
veterinarians, there is probably a degree of choice. These
activities may not be of great public importance as
compared to, for example, public transportation;
however, the pet would undoubtedly be under the control
of the party seeking exculpation, subject to the risk of
carelessness with the owner having little or no
opportunity to take independent protections, and that
factor is a significant consideration.
Nevertheless, in appropriate circumstances, at
least for service providers, contractual provisions could
put the brakes on runaway damage awards. Revisiting
the scenarios at the beginning of this paper may prove

helpful. In Barking Hound Village, LLC v. Monyak,
"Lola," died from acute renal failure because she "was
administered toxic doses of the medication prescribed for
Callie, a much larger dog." 237 In Harabes v. Barkery, Inc.,
"Gabby," died of medical complications after she was
subjected to extreme heat for an extended period of time
clauses must be explicit, prominent, clear and unambiguous
because they extinguish future claims).
2

36 But see Hyatt v. Mini Storage on Green, 236 N.C. App. 278,

284, 763 S.E.2d 166, 171 (2014) (upholding an exculpatory
clause for resulting personal injury).
237 Barking Hound Village, LLC, 787 S.E.2d at 191-93.
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at a dog grooming business. 238 It is unlikely that in either
of those cases an exculpatory clause would have insulated
the proprietor. Arguably, the conduct in Harabes
amounted to gross negligence for which the exculpatory
clause would have been held invalid. Moreover, no
detailed warning of risks would have covered that
situation. Pets may be cut while grooming, they may
wiggle free and be injured jumping from the grooming
table but being subjected to extreme heat is not a
common, anticipated risk about which a warning would
be given. Similarly, in Barking Hound Village, even if the
conduct was simple negligence, no detailed warning of
risks would have covered a situation where the medicines
would be mixed. Warnings more likely would address
reasonably anticipated risks, such as contracting a social
disease like influenza, or, in doggy day care
environments, an injury from rough play.

However, in Hendrickson an exculpatory clause
likely would be enforced. In that case, "Bear" developed a
foreseeable complication after surgery for which a
successful post-operative intervention was not made,
resulting in his death. 239 Providing such risks of surgery
were adequately disclosed, an exculpatory clause should
insulate the provider and limit liability. 240 These four
cases illustrate four situations in which risks are
disclosed and the emotional and physical harm caused by
simple negligence, providers should be covered with a
proper disclosure of risk. Only in more egregious
situations, in which the risk is beyond the realm of
possibilities, would damages be recoverable, including
those for mental anguish, resulting in a fair outcome.

Harabes, 791 A.2d at 1143-44.
Hendrickson, 312 P.3d at 53-57.
240 On the other hand, because there was an additional failure
to diagnosis the condition after the operation, arguably the
clause may not be effective.
238
239
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Of course, if a neighbor or a stranger caused the
destruction of the pet, it is unlikely that there would be
opportunity for a contractual limitation of liability.
Likewise, in Strickland v. Medlen, "Avery," an escaped
family pet, was picked up by animal control and
euthanized, even though the family had requested a hold
be put on their pet until they could get the money to pay
the release fees. 24 1 An exculpatory clause would not work
in this situation either because there is no contractual
relationship. However, there may be some governmental
immunity for municipal animal control units that would

provide some protection from liability. 242 In addition to
exculpatory clauses, which if enforceable, exonerate
future wrongful conduct, other contractual provisions can
limit risk exposure for professional caregivers in
appropriate circumstances, such as liquidated damages
or caps on damage awards.
B. Limitation of Liability for Damages

Both recent legislative initiatives mentioned
previously limit damages in those cases in which
damages are recoverable. 24 3 Contractual provisions also
can limit liability for damages in the event of a breach.
The services provided by veterinarians, groomers, and
boarders are all based in contract. In addition to
including an exculpatory clause accompanied by a
comprehensive list of risks outlined in plain language,
contracts can include a clause agreeing upon damages in

241

Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 186.

242 The Tennessee statute exempts an action for noneconomic

damages for nonprofit and governmental agencies which act on
the behalf of public health or animal welfare. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 44-17-403(e) (2019). A comprehensive discussion about the
recovery of damages in the context of governmental immunity,
however, is beyond the scope of the paper.
243 See supra notes 20 1-210 and accompanying text.
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advance of a breach,2 44 as well as limit liability for
damages to an established cap, as well. A limitation of
liability clause limits the maximum amount of damages
that may be recovered for the negligent acts of a party to
an amount set forth in the contract. Such provisions may
be challenged as being against public policy; 245 however,
courts are willing to enforce them if they are clear and

244 In some agreements, such as construction contracts, the
parties may agree upon damages in advance of a breach. These
liquidated damages clauses attempt to estimate damages in
advance of a breach, and are typically enforceable without
proof of actual damages, providing the clause was not intended
as a penalty. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 509 (2019). See also In
re Dow Corning Corp., 419 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding
that the liquidated damages clause at issue was a penalty
clause unenforceable under Texas law for reasons of public
policy); Goldblatt v. C.P. Motion, Inc., 77 So. 3d 798, 801 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (concluding that the liquidated damages

clause was unenforceable as a penalty because the damages
were readily ascertainable). As long as the amount is a
reasonable estimate of anticipated loss, it is enforceable,
particularly if damages would be difficult to measure
accurately, and the contractual attempt bears a reasonable
relationship to the expected harm. Arctic Contractors v. State,
564 P.2d 30, 49 (Alaska 1977).
245 Some states disfavor limitations of liability. See, e.g., Witt
v. La Gorce Country Club, Inc., 35 So. 3d 1033, 1037 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) (indicating a reluctance to enforce provision for
professional
service
considering
statute
establishing
responsibility for negligence); Lucier v. Williams, 366 N.J.
Super. 485, 493, 841 A.2d 907, 912 (App. Div. 2004) (finding
the limitation of liability provision unconscionable because of
the parties' unequal bargaining status and the stipulated
damages nominal); City of Dillingham v. CH2M Hill Nw., Inc.,
873 P.2d 1271 (Alaska 1994) (limitation of liability clause for
professional services unenforceable under indemnification
statute).
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unambiguous, not in violation of any statute, and the
result of an arm's length transaction.246
Presumably, a clear and reasonable contractual
limitation of noneconomic damages, such as for the
mental anguish stemming from the loss of a pet, would
not be against public policy and would be enforceable,
even if in some cases the parties may not be on equal
footing. There are no statutes disfavoring such a
provision, damages for personal injury are not being

limited, and the actual economic loss would still be
compensable, if proven. As such, the emotional harm
would be properly recognized and compensated, while
being appropriately contained by the parties' contract.24 7

Therefore, in the cases discussed previously for which an
exculpatory clause would not afford protection, 248 a
limitation of liability clause could successfully cap any
noneconomic damages award, at least resulting from
negligent conduct. 249
See, e.g., Blaylock Grading Co., LLP v. Smith, 189 N. C. App.
508, 658 S.E.2d 680 (2008) (limitation of liability did not
implicate the public health or safety and was enforceable);
1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Grp., Inc., 219 Ariz. 200, 201, 196
P.3d 222, 223 (2008) (holding that limitation of liability for
246

surveyor's negligence to surveyor's fees is not contrary to public
policy); Marbro, Inc. v. Borough of Tinton Falls, 297 N.J. Super.

411, 688 A.2d 159 (Law. Div. 1996) (upholding limitation of
liability provisions in contract for professional services); Fort
Knox Self Storage, Inc. v. W. Techs., Inc., 142 P.3d 1 (2006)
(upholding limitation of liability clause for professional
services).

A contractual limitation analogous to the $1000 award in
Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1066
(Haw. 1981) would likely be enforced. The two statutes also
offer guidance for reasonable limitations. See supra notes 201247

210 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 234-235 and accompanying text.

249 A limitation of liability for gross negligence or willful and
wanton conduct arguable would be against public policy and
unconscionable. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sonitrol Mgmt. Corp.,
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VII. Conclusion
The relationship between humans and animals is
a complex one. 2 50 In his book, Some We Love, Some We
Hate, Some We Eat: Why It's So Hard to Think Straight
About Animals, a researcher explored that complex
relationship which seemingly permits such diverse
treatment of animals by humans. 25 1 However, the
recognition

based

on

evidence

in

appropriate

circumstances that some animals should be considered
more than mere tangible property to their owners does
not mean that all animals enjoy that consideration.
Nevertheless, if public policy is reflected in statutes, then
clearly the public policy in federal antidiscrimination
laws

recognizes

the

possibility

of

a property-plus

argument for some animals. 2 52 The plaintiffs in
Strickland detected the oddity that Texas law would
permit sentimental damages for loss of an heirloom but
not a pet, to which the Texas Supreme Court replied that
the "law is no stranger to incongruity." 2 53 That statement
is certainly true for a legal system which concurrently
requires accommodation for ESAs, but does not
compensate for any emotional bond in assessing personal
192 P.3d 543, 550 (Colo. App. 2008) (suggesting that conduct
that is willful and wanton may not be covered by a limitation
of liability clause).
250 For a thorough examination of how the field of animal law
has developed, including key litigation, see Joyce Tischler, A
Brief History of Animal Law, Part I (1972 - 1987), 1 STAN. J.
ANIMAL L. & POL'Y 1 (2008); Joyce Tischler, A Brief History of
Animal Law, PartH1(1985 -.2011), 5 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL'Y
27 (2012).
HAL HERZOG, SOME WE LOvE, SOME WE HATE, SOME WE
EAT: WHY IT'S SO HARD TO THINK STRAIGHT ABOUT ANIMALS
251

(P.S. 2011).

252 See supra notes 75-149 and accompanying text.
253

Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 192.
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injury damages for guardians.

Incongruity may be

familiar to the law, but it is not ideal.
There are numerous examples of the emotional
attachment between some owners to their pets that
underscore the reality that to at least some owners, pets
are not mere property. 254 Even Eggsy couldn't shoot the
pug. 2 55 The emotional harm caused by wrongful loss of a
pet through either a negligent or intentional tort should
be compensated. Certainly, the emotional harm, and the
resulting damages for that injury, would be greater if the
loss was occasioned by gross negligence, intentional
conduct, or willful, wanton and outrageous conduct. 2 56
Nevertheless, a negligent loss that causes what the
Restatement recognizes can be "real and serious"
emotional harm should be compensated, as well. By
recognizing

some pets as being in a property plus

category that harm can be compensated, providing the
plaintiff carries their burden of proof in establishing the
emotional harm suffered.
In the absence of legislation, such recognition
would require a shift in the current common law
classification of animals as mere personal property. But
that type of shift is not unprecedented. Some humans,
most notably slaves and women, were previously
classified as property, as well. 257 Although commentators
worry about a slippery slope, professionals who contract

for pet services can significantly reduce their risk
exposure though the use of reasonably constructed
contractual provisions. 258 As such, plaintiffs bringing
cases most deserving of a mental anguish award would
be the most likely recipients of damage awards.
254 See supra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.
255 KINGSMAN: THE SECRET SERVICE (Twentieth Century Fox

2014).
256 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS

§ 47 cmt. m

(AM. LAW INST.

2012).
257 Paek, supra note 180, at 492-494.
258 See supra notes 221-246 and accompanying text.
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